本文旨在通過布爾廸厄所謂之「庸俗批判」（vulgar critique）來凸顯出康德美學理論與布爾廸厄美學理論之根本差異：普遍主義vs.歷史主義；絕對主義vs.相對主義；理論vs.實踐。這些根本信念的差異，引領著我們去深思有關美學之諸多課題：諸如什麼是美？欣賞美的認知能力為何？是美感？還是理性？是否存在有普遍性的判準來判斷什麼是美？什麼是不美的？是否存在有一套標準的培養程序，使我們可以認識美之為美的事物？ 本文將扼要的描述康德和布爾廸厄對此類議題截然不同的觀點，但是除了呈現康德的普遍主義典範和布爾廸厄的歷史主義典範外，我將深入布爾廸厄「庸俗批判」之底蘊，進一步指出「庸俗批判」實涵蓋兩個看似互相矛盾的層次，分別是：雖然「庸俗批判」凸顯了康德之「學者觀點」之盲點，揭示的是純理論思考活動的「社會先決條件」，純理論思考是免於行動迫切性的「實踐」活動；但是，就另一方面而言，布爾廸厄仍然確保了「學者觀點」，但是凸顯出該觀點所代表的主流文化正當性的根據是客觀的社會實踐，而非來自美本身的本質性認知。 究竟「庸俗批判」所涵蓋的兩個看似互相矛盾的層次，是根本的暴露了「庸俗批判」本身的內在不一致性？還是一如布爾廸厄超越二元論所採取的高明策略？本文最後部分將從三個觀點來探討對「庸俗批判」之批判：分別是Richard Shusterman之「實用美學」（Pragmatist Aesthetics）觀點，批評「庸俗批判」並沒有相對開放低文化（通俗文化）之正當性；二是以David Gartman之「新馬克思主義」觀點，批評「庸俗批判」欠缺了文化所承載的改造社會之功能；三是以Sayer Andrew之「現代主義」觀點，批判「庸俗批判」欠缺判斷之規範性，喪失社會批判的積極建構面向。本文的結論是：「庸俗批判」所涵蓋的兩個看似互相矛盾的層次，實在是布爾廸厄超越二元論所必須採取的微妙平衡與高明策略。

As an admirer of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, I always wonder how he keeps the extreme delicate balance between dualisms of determinism/action, habitus/pratice, subjectivism/objectivism, and last but not the very least, economism(interest)/cultural distinction(disinterestedness). This work is another test cast of showing how his sophisticated balance is accomplished, claiming another prestige across sociological field in particular, and academic field in general. The aim of this paper is to explore Bourdieu's theory of culture(Distinction) in terms of his vulgar critique of Kant's aesthetics. Through vulgar critique, we are presented two different models of culture, namely, artistic judgment of genius with inborn cultural endowment(Kant) vs. artistic judgment conditioned by and conditioning social relation of existence(economy). Special focus would be to reveal the theoretical implications of vulgar critique. To my understanding, vulgar critique conveys two seemingly contradictory senses and implications, namely, on the one hand, as an external critique, it reveals the sociological conditions of aesthetic purity, yet leaving the legitimacy of high arts intact. On the other hand, as an internal critique, it reveals that the ground of the aesthetic legitimacy does not lie on the gifted individuals endowed with natural distinction who, accordingly, are able to uncover the essence of beauty; instead, the ground of asethetic legitimacy lies on cultural habitus made possible by the distance from necessity. Likewise, aesthetic legitimacy is not static, timeless and essential. As objective social relations of existence changes, aesthetic legitimacy change as well. However can vulgar critique be both an external critique and an internal critique? Is it a self-contradictory project? or a highly sophisticated theoretical strategy? Without doubt, vulgar critique is another case testing whether or not Bourdieu can keep sophisticated balance between the seemingly contradictory positions. In the last part of this paper, I will present three perspectives questioning Bourdieu's vulgar critique, they are, (1)pragmatist aesthetics of R. Shusterman criticizing vulgar critique of failing to legitimize popular or low arts; (2)neo-marxism of David Gartman criticizing vulgar critique as sociological reductionism, dismantling culture's social reformation function; and (3)modernism of Andrew Sayer criticizing vulgar critique as "uncritical social sciences", for Bourdieu's suspicion of disinterested and normative judgments leaves no room for social betterment and progress. In the end, I will conclude this paper, in Bourdieu's own terms, by responding to the above three objections of vulgar critique. All in all, I would argue that they all fail in their attempt to criticize vulgar critique. Neither is vulgar critique an one-sided sociological reductionism, nor is it self-conflicting. On the very contrary, I will show that once they, in fact, acknowledge and appreciate the importance of habitus and social conditions of culture, their perspectives become complements rather than critique of Bourdieu's theory of culture. In other words, once admitting the brilliance of Bourdieu's theory of culture as they all did, their models of culture are assimilated in Bourdieu's culture theory. The latter entails the former, but not vice versa.