關於福利制度的檢討與省思，免不了要觸及福利制度之所以存在的道德基礎；本文的討論就著落在這樣的脈絡之中。哲學家顧鼎（Robert E. Goodin）近年來嘗試另闢蹊徑，替福利國家提供一個不同的道德理由，他認為，福利國家的核心制度是社會救助制度，而該制度的道德基礎在於整個社會對於那些走投無路、三餐不繼、無法自行滿足基本需要、不得不依靠政府的救濟以維生的窮苦人民，必須承擔起保護化們免於因為所處的劣勢依靠處境受到剝削所威晶的道德責任。顧鼎以他所謂「保護劣勢依靠者原則」（Protecting the Vulnerable）以及「預防剝肖性依靠關係原則（Preventing Exploitable Vulnerabilities）這兩個普遍性道德原則來做為立論福利國家之所以應該存在的道德理由。本文目的除了將顧鼎的福利理論說清楚講明白之外，也將提出幾點值得進一步深思的批評。筆者主張，顧鼎的福利理論在推論上有瑕疵，在應用上則受到侷限。最後也帶入當代女性主義哲學家琦黛（Eva F. Kittay）對於顧鼎理論的批評與修正。

An understanding of the moral reasons for the welfare state is the prerequisite of any criticisms of it. In the past two deceases. Report E. Goodin has argued for a moral reason grounded in the moral principle of protecting the vulnerable. This paper provides a critical discussion of Goodin’s welfare theory, which may be summarized as the thesis that the welfare state shoulders our collective responsibility to provide assistance to those that the welfare state shoulder sour collective responsibility to provide assistance to those whose interests are dependent upon and vulnerable to our actions and decision, in order to protect them from being exploited in virtue of their vulnerabilities and dependencies. Kittay’s feminist critique of the welfare state, in general, and Goodin’s vulnerability model, in particular, is brought into discussion as well, as part of the critical evaluation of Goodin’s welfare theory, in which I argue that Goodin’s welfare theory is vulnerable to theoretical and practical difficulties.