植文針對「福利權」的相關議題進行哲學性思考。在釐清福利理論與福利哲學的差異之後，筆者主張「福權」應該界定為「滿足基本需求的權利」。本文的主要部分係針對四種替福利權辯護的論證進行批判性的討論。筆者主張，基於「生存權」的論在邏輯上是無效的；至於「需求」概念的論證也不成立，除谷因為概念上的限制之外，也因為種論證未來能充實「基本需要」的內涵。筆者接著討論另外兩種論證，它們都把焦點擺在基本需要上，藉著基本價值(即基本目的)與其他道德原則(公正)的協助，深化基本需要的內容，以便替福利權辯護。普蘭特的論證將基本需要奠基在道德體系之所以可能的先決件條件，至於羅爾斯的公正理論則是將基本需要的滿足界定為一個公義社會的先決條件。筆者主張，這兩個理論各有其限制。

This essay aims to provide a framework for philosophical thinking of “welfare right” and its related issues. It starts out by distinguishing welfare philosophy form the so-called welfare theory; it is then argued that “welfare right” should be defined, in a narrower sense, as “the right to satisfy one’s basic human needs”. The main issue is, whether or not welfare right should be part of the basic human rights. A great proportion of this essay is devoted to a critical discussion of four different arguments for welfare right, including: argument from “the right to life”, argument form the concept of “need”, Raymond Plant’s argument form basic needs as the preconditions of morality, and the argument, inspired by John Rawls’s theory of justice, that a just society prescribes the satisfaction of the basic needs of its citizens. None of these arguments, I argue, suffices to be conclusively in favor of welfare right.