近十多年來，在全球化的風潮席捲之下，美國與西歐工業國家為了解決「福利依賴」(welfare dependency)與「社會排除」(social exclusion)的困境，紛紛求助於workfare這個理念來推動福利制度的改造工程。而workfare的相關理念儼然成為根除社會福利制度諸多弊端的萬靈丹。與全球接軌的台灣學界，也開始如雨後春筍般湧現各種討論workfare的論述。本文將著落於那樣的論述氛圍中;不同的是，筆者將採取較為批判性的角度來思考一個更為根本的規範性問題:workfare這個福利原則背後的理論根據為何?這些理論根據是否能夠禁得起理性的論證與檢視?如果我們的目標是要追求一個符合公平與正義的社會，那麼我們是否也該支持workfare的理念呢?因此，本文的主要部分將分別介紹保守派與自由派陣營支持workfare理念的主要論誰，隨後並針對各自的論誰加以批判。筆者以米德(Lawrence M. Mead)的理論作為保守派陣營的代表，而自由派的論誰主要圍繞在公民間互惠義務(mutual obligations)與公正(justice)等自由主義的核心概念。筆者在本文中主張，這兩個陣營用來支持workfare理念的論誰，都禁不起理性的檢驗，無法替workfare理念提供強有力的道德基礎。

The notion of "workfare" has grasped people's attention as a potential panacea to all problems associated with old-fashioned welfare institutions, such as welfare dependency in the United States and social exclusion in Europe. Policies that fall under the rubric of workfare attach the actual work requirement to welfare benefits, as a prerequisite to the reception of welfare and related benefits, in order to force long-term welfare dependents out of the welfare payroll, into the labor market. Whether or not the workfare policies have succeeded in these goals has been an on­going issue for empirical researchers; this article, however, takes on the topic from a normative perspective. Instead of asking whether the workfare policies work, this article asks: what are the normative reasons in favor of the workfare idea? Is the work requirement consistent with the belief that welfare is a matter of human right? If justice is the moral justification of a welfare state, will the workfare idea undermine the principles of justice? To facilitate the philosophical discussion to come, I shall begin with two preliminary sections, arguing for a proper definition of "workfare" and explaining its historical development in the US, respectively. Afterwards, I shall examine two different approaches to justify the workfare idea: the conservative approach championed by Lawrence M. Mead, and then the egalitarian liberal approach from the notion of mutual obligations, and, behind it, the notion of fairness. I am going to argue that Mead's paternalist conservative account fails to deliver the conclusive reason for the workfare idea, because both the perfectionist premise and the pathological premise in his argument are far from the truth. The liberal attempt to justify the workfare idea on the basis of mutual obligations, or reciprocity, also fails to offer convincing reasons, because, borrowing articles by Robert E. Goodin, the ambiguity and multiplicity of the notion of reciprocity has made it extremely difficult to endorse one specific form of reciprocal relation required by the workfare idea. My claim is that none of the reasons discussed in this article in favor of the workfare idea has succeeded in offering a convincing reason for the workfare idea.