傳統關於政治預算循環 (political budget cycles)的實證研究大都在探討選舉對一國總預算支出的影響，忽略了執政者可以在總支出水準維持不變或不增加財政赤字的情況下，經由支出項目的更動來達到勝選目的。除此之外，傳統的實證研究也大多假設行政部門對預算有完全的行政裁量權 (discretionary power)，而忽略了立法部門扮演否決者 (veto players)對行政裁量權的制衡功能 (checks and balances)。r 目前國內尚無立法制衡指標的建立，所以本文主要目的之一是建構完成地方立法機關的有效制衡指標。首先，參考 Henisz(2005)建構我國 21縣市立法機關的政治限制指標 (political constraint index)作為否決者的衡量；利用國際風險指南 (International Country Risk Guide)資料庫所公布的台灣法治指標 (law and order index)作為衡量台灣遵循法律的程度，然後結合這兩種指標，建構完成台灣省 21縣市立法機關從 1984年到 2009年的有效制衡指標。本文依據所建構完成的地方立法機關之制衡指標，配合地方政府預算支出及選舉相關變數，從 1984到 2009年的縱橫資料，採用一般化動差法 (generalized method of moments)進行實證分析，探討地方選舉對公共支出項目的影響，以及地方立法機關制衡功能對地方政治預算循環的影響效果。r 實證結果顯示，執政者確實於選舉期間調整預算支出細項來達成勝選目的，譬如刪減一般政務支出預算移向社會福利支出預算。實證結果也顯示，加入有效的立法制衡，確實可減緩或消除政治預算循環的影響，而且不論地方首長有無自由裁量權，並不影響立法機關的制衡能力。

Previous empirical work on political budget cycles focused solely on the dynamics of overall budget, and implicitly assumes the executive has full discretion over fiscal policy. This study goes beyond traditional political budget cycles models and shed light on the case study of 21 local governments in Taiwan over the 1984-2009 periods. To explore how the level of checks and balances can explain the size of the political budget cycles, the political constraints index for the 21 local governments in Taiwan province is developed following the coding procedure of Henisz(2005). The law and order index from the International Country Risk Guide are used to measure compliance with the law. The proxy for effective checks and balances on executive discretionary power over the 1984 to 2009 period are established with the combination of the political constraints index and the law and order index. The impacts of elections, checks and balances on the allocation of local public expenditures over the period of 1984 to 2009 are then explored by using the generalized method of moments developed for dynamic models of the panel data of Taiwan’s 21 local governments. The empirical results show that the government would indeed adjust the budget expenditures contents to achieve their goals in the election period. Such as, the deletion of the general government budget expenditures towards the social welfare expenditure budget. By incorporating effective legislative checks and balances into the model, the effect of political budget cycles can indeed be moderated or counteracted. Regardless of whether the local government has discretion or not, it does not affect the checks and balances ability of the legislature.