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題名：台灣地方公共支出實證研究─中位投票者模型與政治景氣循環模型之應用
作者：馮永猷
作者(外文)：Yung-yu Feng
校院名稱：國立中山大學
系所名稱：公共事務管理研究所
指導教授：吳濟華
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2009
主題關鍵詞：選舉循環；地方公共支出；中位所得；政治景氣循環模型；中位投票者模型；election cycle；median income；political business cycle model；median voter model；local public expenditure
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台灣近二十年來，地方公共支出快速成長，公共收入不足，地方財政狀況趨於惡化。地方公共支出受政治、經濟、社會與制度性等因素的影響，尤其是民眾對公共財需求，地方選舉、政黨輪替與議會結構變遷，乃至於精省，其間之關係都需要深入探討。本研究以台灣的21縣市、1989年至2007年為研究對象，分別應用中位投票者模型、政治景氣循環模型，並以縱橫資料 (panel data) 的迴歸方法進行實證分析，以檢驗各研究變數對各項地方公共支出 (採平均每人值) 的影響。
實證結果顯示：中位所得對各項支出的影響，除經濟發展支出外，皆具正向顯著性，與預期相符，但也凸顯地方經濟發展並不符合多數民眾的需求。中位所得與平均所得差距的影響，總支出、社會福利支出、警政支出與經濟發展支出會因貧富差距擴大而增加。分攤稅額與補助款顯著程度高，但是分攤稅額為正向影響，與預期不符，表示民眾對支出需求與租稅負擔之間有很大的落差，和過度依賴上級補助款有密切關係。人口、人口密度變數則以負向影響居多，但是人口愈多對社會福利支出需求愈高，人口密度愈高對教育科學文化支出需求愈高。精省前後的比較，鄉、鎮、縣轄市的補助支出減少，多項支出精省後皆高於精省前，不同變數的影響互有差異。
本研究也發現：選舉年、選舉前後年度的影響，差異頗大，與傳統的選舉前支出顯著增加、選舉後支出顯著減少的循環現象不盡相同。縣市長尋求連任與否，對多項支出並無顯著差異，總支出、經濟發展支出為負向影響，與尋求連任者較會增加支出的假設預期不符。縣市長施政滿意度的高低會顯著影響地方支出與收支平衡，高施政滿意度的同時，也伴隨著較為增高支出與擴大赤字的負擔，縣長的情形較為顯著。泛藍政黨執政的縣市相對於泛綠執政的縣市採取較大的支出擴張作為，在總支出、資本門支出與社會福利支出的趨勢較為明顯，而且赤字也較為增加的情形。選舉與政黨變數的交互影響，國民黨與民進黨在選舉當年對支出項目重視的程度各有不同，前者增加經濟發展支出，後者增加教育科學文化支出、社區環保支出。國民黨在縣議會席次所佔比例愈高時，鄉、鎮、縣轄市的補助支出會顯著增加。至於「水平」(府會間) 一致政府或分立政府的影響，多屬無差異，但存在分立政府的總支出、社會福利支出高於一致政府的情形，縣的經濟發展支出、社區環保支出則是一致政府高於分立政府。「垂直」(府際間) 一致政府或分立政府的影響，顯示僅有社會福利支出具有負向顯著的影響，其餘支出皆不具統計顯著性。赤字之遞延變項也出現正向顯著的影響，顯示地方課責問題的嚴重性。
從選民需求、選舉與政黨角度對照兩模型實證結果，總支出、經常門、資本門支出與鄉、鎮、縣轄市補助支出同時受到三方面力量的影響；經濟發展支出受選舉顯著的影響；教育科學文化支出、警政支出、社區及環保支出受到選舉與政黨影響程度較小，但較符合選民需求。也以非巢式檢定 (non-nested test) 比較兩個模型對各項地方公共支出的解釋力，結果顯示彼此皆未優於對方。
本研究從縣市整體、縣與市分為兩群、選舉與政黨交互影響、精省前後進行檢驗的結果，顯示選民需求、選舉與政黨因素確實對地方公共支出具有不同程度的影響性，也是政策與制度層面應予重視之處。
This research attempts to examine whether economic, social, political and institutional factors affected local public expenditures (per capita) in Taiwan. The panel data regression analysis, covering the period from 1989 to 2007, used statistics from the 21 prefectures (5 cities and 16 counties) of Taiwan by applying the median voter model and political business cycle (PBC) model.
The findings from the empirical data suggest that the explanatory variable of the median income is significant and has a positive sign as predicted by the priori expectation, with the exception of economic development expenditure. The gap between the median income and average income variables has positive signs in the total, social welfare, police and economic development expenditures. The tax share variable and grant variable on all categories of spending are significant, but the positive sign of the tax share variable contrasts a priori expectations. The population variable and population density variable have negative signs in different expenditures, while the social welfare and the education, science, and culture expenditures have positive signs. Comparing the difference before and after the downsizing of the Taiwan Provincial Government, the significance of the latter is higher than the former, and the effects of various variables differ.
The results of this research also indicated that the variables of the pre-election year, election year and post-election year demonstrated statistical significance with varying directional tendencies, and that the results are inconsistent with the traditional hypothesis of the election cycle. The incumbent magistrates or mayors, regardless of whether they do or do not intend on re-election, exhibit no significant influence on most expenditures, and thus this does not agree with a priori expectations. The administrative satisfactions of incumbent magistrates or mayors have statistically significant influence on the expenditures and deficits.
Generally, the Pan-KMT incumbent magistrates or mayors have more motives to increase the total and capital expenditures and deficits than the Pan-DPP. Interestingly, the KMT party, which held the majority of seats in the county council, has a positive sign and statistically significant influence on the expenditure of grants to townships. The evidence has demonstrated that a unified government or divided government (horizontal type or vertical type) has no significant influence on most of the expenditure forms, although a negative sign on social welfare expenditure is evident
in 21 counties and cities. The lagged deficit is significant with a positive sign, which implies that the insufficiency of local accountability and deficits are becoming a long-term problem.
When comparing the power of the median voter model and political business cycle model in explaining the local public expenditure, a non-nested test was implemented. No model was found to hold an advantage over another model.
In brief, the current research indicates that the factors of the majority voters'' demands, elections and parties indeed have different influences on various expenditure forms in Taiwan.
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