After its retreat from mainland China, the government of Republic of China had gone through numerous discussions over the reasons for its failure to suppress the communist rebellion. Some of the reasons found are that both the supervision system and the organizational structure of the R.O.C. Armed Forces had major defects. In order to reconstruct the Armed Forces in the 1950s, the crucial measure taken was to re-establish the political warfare system. In March, 1950 after his restoration to take the full charge of political affairs in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Chiang Ching-kuo Director of the Political Warfare to the Ministry of Defense. Later on, Chiang reformed entirely the political warfare system of the Armed Forces in accordance with Soviet doctrines that he had learned while in Russia. After the reformation, the political warfare sections would become sections of staff within each and every unit of the R.O.C Armed Forces, and each director of political warfare department would become a member of chief-of-staff in each commanding officer's unit. The power granted to a director of political warfare at that time was seen to be in conflict with the authority of each commanding officer. This brought forth the opposition from officers at the higher chain of command. The U.S Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) also considered the system to be a cause of confusion for command, and requested to have the system abolished. However, despite the pressure from the MAAG, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo decided to withhold the system after due consideration.