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題名：代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會監督機制之探討
書刊名：財金論文叢刊
作者：張椿柏／王育偉／林小雯
作者(外文)：Chang, Chun-po／Wang, Yu-wei／Lin, Xiao-wen
出版日期：2015
卷期：22
頁次：頁15-37
主題關鍵詞：實質盈餘管理；董事會特性；核心代理問題；Real earnings management；Board characteristics；Core agency problem
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:199
  • 點閱點閱:196
本文主要特色在於：將代理問題區分為核心代理問題和權益代理問題，探討代理問題與董事會特性對公司實質盈餘管理影響的研究。研究對象為1996年至2013年間之台灣上市（櫃）公司，樣本數共19543筆。實證結果如下：在本研究中顯示董事會規模與實質盈餘管理呈負向顯著關係，表示董事會規模與其運作會抑制實質盈餘管理的情況。董事會組成與獨立性方面，外部獨立董事席次比率過半與實質盈餘管理呈正向顯著關係，顯示外部董事的比率過半的監督效果並不理想。核心代理問題與實質盈餘管理呈正向顯著的關係，發現核心代理問題較嚴重的公司，實質盈餘管理行為較嚴重。管理者持股比率與盈餘管理存在非線性關係，管理者持股比率在5%以下與實質盈餘管理呈負向顯著關係，但持股比率大於25%時與實質盈餘管理呈正向顯著關係。
The main feature of this study is that we divide the agency problem into core agency problem and equity agency problem, and we explore the relation between agency problem and real earnings management. This research has collected 19543 samples, which are from the firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 1996-2013. The empirical results are as follows: Board size correlates negatively and significantly with real earnings management. It means the size as well as the board operating efficiency will suppress its real earnings management. In terms of board composition and independence, the external independent directors and real earnings management showed a significantly positive relationship. When 50% of the board is composed of external independent directors, its supervising function does not work well. Core agency problems and real earnings management correlate with a significantly positive relationship. When a business has severe core substitution problem and its manager is not self-disciplined, its real earning management will be worse. The managerial ownership has an U-shape relationship with real earnings management. When managerial ownership ratio is below 5%, it correlates negatively significant with real earnings management. When managerial ownership ratio is greater than 25%, it correlates significantly positive with real earnings management.
期刊論文
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學位論文
1.鄭宏哲(2012)。董事會特性暨會計師產業專精於權益資金成本之研究(碩士論文)。國立臺中科技大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.黃柏庭(2007)。真實營業活動相關之盈餘管理研究(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
3.黃祥睿(2013)。董事會特性與股權結構對實質盈餘管理影響之研究(碩士論文)。國立臺中科技大學。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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