:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:目標不一致、員工分紅與最適所得稅制
書刊名:人文及社會科學集刊
作者:顏志達翁堃嵐 引用關係
作者(外文):Yen, Chih-taUeng, Glen K. L.
出版日期:2015
卷期:27:3
頁次:頁547-572
主題關鍵詞:員工分紅逆選擇道德冒險最適所得稅制Pay for performanceAdverse selectionMoral hazardOptimal income taxation
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(1) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:1
  • 共同引用共同引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:41
傳統探討最適所得稅的文獻大都著重在政府與納稅人間的課稅問題上,忽略了勞動市場中雇主與勞工間的互動。有鑑於此,本文建構一個勞動市場同時存在逆選擇(adverse selection)與道德冒險(moral hazard)問題的二元模型,來探討最適所得稅制的訂定。本文的研究顯示:在勞動市場存在逆選擇等訊息不對稱的情況下,工資契約取代了所得稅制所扮演的篩選功能,因此最適的差異化(非線性)所得稅制旨在進行所得重分配,並在工作誘因與風險效率等效果間取得平衡。此時不管高、低能力者的誘因相容限制式何者會受約束,高能力者或低能力者所面對的邊際稅率都不必然為零。
Conventional literature neglects the impact of incomplete information in the labor market on the design of optimal taxation. This paper constructs a model with adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the labor market to reexamine the theory of optimal income taxation. It is shown that optimal taxation should take into account the policy goals of income redistribution, work motivation and risk efficiency. Moreover, the marginal tax rate of high ability laborers may be positive or negative. Hence the conventional wisdom of zero marginal tax rates on high ability laborers is no longer valid. This result is different from that of the conventional literature.
期刊論文
1.呂俊慧、翁堃嵐(2015)。商品不可分割性與最適所得稅。經濟論文叢刊。new window  延伸查詢new window
2.Aronsson, Thomas、Johansson-Stenman, Olof(2008)。When the Joneses' Consumption Hurts: Optimal Public Good Provision and Nonlinear Income Taxation。Journal of Public Economics,92(5/6),986-997。  new window
3.Atkinson, Anthony B.(1970)。On the Measurement of Inequality。Journal of Economic Theory,2(3),244-263。  new window
4.Boadway, Robin、Leite-Monteiro, Manuel、Marchand, Maurice、Pestieau, Pierre(2006)。Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection。Scandinavian Journal of Economics,108(2),279-298。  new window
5.Boadway, Robin、Marchand, Maurice、Pestieau, Pierre(1994)。Towards a Theory of the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix。Journal of Public Economics,55(1),71-88。  new window
6.Boadway, Robin、Keen, Michael(1993)。Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation。International Economic Review,34(3),463-478。  new window
7.Cremer, Helmuth、Pestieau, Pierre、Rochet, Jean-Charles(2001)。Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisited。International Economic Review,42(3),781-800。  new window
8.Dahan, Momi、Strawczynski, Michel(2000)。Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates: Comment。American Economic Review,90(3),681-686。  new window
9.Diamond, Peter A.(1998)。Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates。American Economic Review,88(1),83-95。  new window
10.Kanbur, Ravi、Tuomala, Matti(1994)。Inherent Inequality and the Optimal Graduation of Marginal Tax Rates。Scandinavian Journal of Economics,96(2),275-282。  new window
11.Mirrlees, James Alexander(1975)。Optimal Commodity Taxation in a Two-Class Economy。Journal of Public Economics,4(1),27-33。  new window
12.Naito, Hisahiro(1999)。Re-Examination of Uniform Commodity Taxes under a Non-Linear Income Tax System and Its Implication for Production Efficiency。Journal of Public Economics,71(2),165-188。  new window
13.Nava, Mario、Schroyen, Fred、Marchand, Maurice(1996)。Optimal Fiscal and Public Expenditure Policy in a Two-Class Economy。Journal of Public Economics,61(1),119-137。  new window
14.Prendergast, Canice(1999)。The Provision of Incentives in Firms。Journal of Economic Literature,37(1),7-63。  new window
15.Del Mar Racionero, Maria(2001)。Optimal Tax Mix with Merit Goods。Oxford Economic Papers,53(4),628-641。  new window
16.Sadka, Efraim(1976)。On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation。The Review of Economic Studies,43(2),261-268。  new window
17.Schroyen, Fred(1997)。Pareto Efficient Income Taxation under Costly Monitoring。Journal of Public Economics,65(3),343-366。  new window
18.Seade, J. K.(1977)。On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules。Journal of Public Economics,7(2),203-236。  new window
19.Stiglitz, Joseph Eugene(1982)。Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation。Journal of Public Economics,17(2),213-240。  new window
20.Strawczynski, Michel(1998)。Social Insurance and the Optimum Piecewise Linear Income Tax。Journal of Public Economics,69(3),371-388。  new window
21.Sung, Jaeyoung(1995)。Linearity with Project Selection and Controllable Diffusion Rate in Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems。Rand Journal of Economics,26(4),720-743。  new window
22.Sung, Jaeyoung(2005)。Optimal Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Approach。Review of Financial Studies,18(3),1021-1073。  new window
23.Tuomala, Matti(1984)。Optimal Degree of Progressivity under Income Uncertainty。Scandinavian Journal of Economics,86(2),184-193。  new window
24.Varian, Hal R.(1980)。Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance。Journal of Public Economics,14(1),49-68。  new window
25.Andersson, Fredrik(1996)。Income Taxation and Job-Market Signaling。Journal of Public Economics,59(2),277-298。  new window
26.Tuomala, Matti(1984)。On the Optimal Income Taxation: Some Further Numerical Results。Journal of Public Economics,23(3),351-366。  new window
27.Mirrlees, James Alexander(1971)。An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation。The Review of Economic Studies,38(2),175-208。  new window
28.Holmström, Bengt、Milgrom, Paul R.(1987)。Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives。Econometrica,55(2),303-328。  new window
29.Hölmstrom, Bengt(1979)。Moral Hazard and Observability。The Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91。  new window
學位論文
1.顏志達(2009)。員工分紅與最適所得稅(博士論文)。國立政治大學。new window  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Atkinson, Anthony B.、Stiglitz, Joseph E.(1980)。Lectures on Public Economics。New York:McGraw-Hill。  new window
圖書論文
1.Stiglitz, Joseph Eugene(1987)。Principal and Agent。The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics。London:Palgrave Macmillan。  new window
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
QR Code
QRCODE