本文嘗試說明牟宗三與海德格雖然不約而同崇尚「超越」，背後卻是兩套迥然不同的哲學系統。牟宗三標舉「作為宗教的儒學」，認為儒學的「心」兼備「超越」與「內在」兩個面向，比起基督教更勝一籌。他雖然認同海德格「超越論的對象＝x」的詮釋，但是最終還是與之分道揚鑣， 因為他認為海氏不能肯定真正的「超越」，故此直斥其哲學只是「無本之論」。可是，海德格大概會說牟宗三誤解了「超越」。真正的「超越」應該是探討形而上學所以可能的條件。若是設定某個「超越者」為根基，在存在論上往往未經審查，有可能是虛妄。海德格揭示「超越」其實是一個「超越論的界域」，這個界域在經驗上可謂一無內容（「無」），卻是經驗所以可能的條件。直接點說，界域即是世界與時間性。人可以根據世界與時間性來組織自己的生活經驗，理解自身之所走。人無須寄託彼岸的存在者，而可以直接面對自己的歷史處境，活出生命的意義。

This paper tries to argue that despite both Mou Zongsan and Heidegger highlight the concept of transcendence, their concerns of it are nevertheless grounded on two distinct philosophical systems. Mou starts his theorization of transcendence from the religiousity of Confucianism. He thinks that Confucianism is better than Christianity, as heart-mind from the former has both the aspects of ”transcendence” and ”immanent”, while for the latter, only transcendence is at issue. Although he appreciates Heidegger's interpretation of ”transcendental object = x”, Mou keeps a distance from the latter eventually. In the eyes of Mou, Heidegger does not understand the true sense of ”transcendence”, and he criticizes Heidegger's philosophy as a ”doctrine without foundation”. However, from a Heideggerian point of view, Mou may misunderstand the meaning of ”transcendence”, which is related to the investigation of the conditions of possibility of metaphysics, but not to anything else. An ontology grounded in a transcendent being may be an illusion. Heidegger attempts to show that ”transcendence” is a ”transcendental horizon”, which has no empirical content (”nothing”) and yet it is the condition of possibility of experience. To put it more clearly, horizon in the Heideggerian sense is worldhood and temporality, and we can organize our experience and understand who we are in accordance with worldhood and temporality. We can live a meaningful life by keeping an eye on our historical situatedness, rather than on a transcendent being.