政治關聯為一新興而重要的研究議題。既有研究指出一家企業與政黨或政治人物有所連結，對公司的營運與公司治理將產生利益，但同時也會產生成本。由於股利的發放關係到公司的財務健全與股東利益，同時也是重要的公司治理指標之一，本文利用台灣上市公司在2004年至2013年的資料，檢驗公司政治關聯程度與股利政策的關聯性。在政治關聯程度的衡量上，本文利用台灣地區所有出版的報紙中，以關鍵字搜尋上市公司名稱/董事長人名與政黨名稱/黨主席(總統)人名之交互相關的新聞筆數來衡量公司的政治關聯程度，同時本文也區分公司與執政黨/在野黨的政治關聯程度，以分析公司的股利政策受到與執政與在野黨之政治關聯的影響是否有所不同。主要實證結果顯示，首先，上市公司與國民黨的政治關聯程度較高，而董事長的政治關聯程度大於以公司名義定義之政治關聯程度。第二，就全樣本來看，與國民黨政治連結會降低股利發放之機率，與民進黨政治連結則會增加股利發放之機率，然而不論與國民黨還是民進黨的政治連結程度上升，皆增加股利發放的不穩定。第三，公司與執政黨或在野黨之政治關聯的利益與成本來看，在民進黨執政時期，與執政黨連結沒有顯著的益處，但與在野黨連結則會降低股利發放之機率；在國民黨執政時期，與執政黨連結將產生益處，反應在較高機率的股利發放，與在野黨連結則會出現降低股利發放機率的情形。本文將股利發放多寡與公司營運成果相連結來解釋政治關聯與股利政策的關係，與執政黨連結將產生有助於營運績效的利益而使公司有較高的機率發放股利，而與在野黨連結將不利公司營運進而反映在股利發放機率的降低上。

This paper employs the data of listed companies on Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) between 2004 and 2013 to examine the linkage between political connection and corporate dividend policy. To measure political connection, news are screened computed from the Parliamentary Library of the Legislative Yuan (News and Knowledge Management System) by the intersection with to the name of listed companies, board chair name, party, president and party chairman. There are four principal findings. First, full samples analysis shows that company tends to prefer to establish connenction with KMT instead of DPP, and board chair’s political connection is larger than company’s political connection. Second, under full sample, while connecting with KMT tends to have lower probability of paying dividend, connecting with DPP has higher probability of paying dividend. Connecting with both parties increases dividend payout volatility. Third, during period of DPP as ruling party, little evidience shows that connecting with DDP increases dividend, yet there is significance negative relationship between the degree of political connection with KMT and probability of paying dividends. Finally, during period of KMT as ruling party, evidience shows that connecting with DPP decreases dividend, and there is significance positive relationship between the degree of political connection with KMT and probability of paying dividends. Our evidence shows that the benefit of political connection emerges as a company is connected with ruling party and the cost of political connection emerges as a company is connected with opposite party. Dividend payout as an important corporate governance indicator is associated with political connection.