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題名:政商網絡的建立必然使企業獲利嗎?
書刊名:管理學報
作者:張琬喻 引用關係
作者(外文):Jang, Woan-yuh
出版日期:2005
卷期:22:2
頁次:頁155-172
主題關鍵詞:政商關係政治投資事件研究法認知評估Government-business relationshipsPolitical investmentEvent study methodologyCognitive appraisal
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(6) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:5
  • 共同引用共同引用:330
  • 點閱點閱:27
本研究以民國78年1月至民國91年4月間擔任臺灣公開發行公司重要職位者第一次當選立法委員及擁有立委身分者兼任公開發行公司重要職位者為樣本,共55筆,採用事件研究法來探討股票市場對政商網絡建立的消息是否有異常報酬。本研究發現,就商入政樣本而言,當上市上櫃公司擔任重要職位者第一次參與立委選舉當選時,股票市場有商入政效應。細究之,此商入政事件若發生於多頭市場,有正的平均異常報酬,若發生於空頭市場則為負。另外就政入商樣本而言,當立委身分者受邀擔任公司重要職務之事件宣告時,無論多空頭時期,股票市場皆有負的政入商效應。
The so-called ”government-business relationship” is an interactive process between the political market and the economic market. French political economist De Jouvenel (1957) thinks that economics is concerned with making effective use of available resources while politics is concerned with increasing resources. When politics and economics seek to increase or use effectively ”limited resources,” the most probable method would be to use ”power to draw out profit” or ”profit seeks power” and then combine politics and economics after all. Although economics and politics are divided into different fields in terms of functions and research logic, as well as the development of the discipline, nevertheless economic behavior is usually a means to achieve political objectives; political behavior is also seen as a way to further economic ends. Moreover, political sociologist Marger (1981) believes that the governing body (government) and the business class (firms) are what can most reveal the power relationship and economic process of political power and economic power. For rulers, the business class has the support of production and government; in the eyes of the business class, ruling power protects and distribute. Even if the way businesses operate can help businesses gain reasonable profit, however, owners or high-level executives hope that political investments can effective influence their own firms or the determination of financial policies related to industry profi. In this way, uncertainty can be minimized while its survival chances improved and profits are maximized. In this light, the current research addresses the effects of businessmen joining politics (business entering politics) and politicians joining businesses (politics entering business); the study also evaluates the effect of the establishment of a government-business network on company performance. Concretely, this research uses the event study method to study important executives working at stock market listed companies who have been elected for the first time as legislators and people with legislative status who are invided to be major executives in publicly listed companies. The study also observes the effect of the announcement of these two events on stock market (that is, if there are businessmen entering politics and politicians entering business). Aside from the above, the research further divides the capital market into bull and bear market periods based on Block's (1977) definition in order to explore whether or not announcements of events in different market periods (bull and bear) will give rise to different results. This study is the first to concretely evaluate the effect on company values when announcements of businessmen entering politics or politicians entering business are made. Based on the empirical study, this research hopes to provide, through the research results, concrete management suggestions to investors and businesses. The research collects 55 cases, as sample, of important executives working at stock market listed companies who have been elected for the first time as legislators and people with legislative status who are also invited to be major executives in publicly listed companies from January 1989 to April 2002. The group is divided into two samples: businessmen entering politics, and politicians entering business. After this, the bull and bear market factor is introduced and then the event study method explores whether any abnormal returns are caused on the stock market when news of politics-business relationships are announced. In other words, the study investigates the effect of the announcement of businessmen entering politics and politicians entering business on stockholder wealth. Through verification analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1. When important executives of publicly listed companies join elections for the first time and when legislators are elected, the stock market displays a ”businessmen entering politics effect.” Further investigation reveals that if the event happens in a bull market, the stock prices tend to rise; if it happens in a bear market, prices slide. 2. When announcement is made about legislators occupying important positions in a publicly listed company, no matter whether it is in a bull or bear market period, the stock market will display a negative ”politician entering business reaction.” After the announcement, the negative average abnormal return will last at least for four trading days. At all times and in all countries, ”politics-business combinations” and ”anti-business complexes” are manifest and present, becoming two opposing forces in society. This is shown in cases such as Taiwan's close relationship with the U.S. (Clinton's ”Whitewater scandal”), Japan (Ruei Ke Luke Co.'s insider trading incident), and Korea (Kim Do Huan and Roh Tai Yu corruption cases) until Taiwan's (Hua Long case) that revealed the scandal of politics-business collusions. This has resulted in a mostly negative evaluation of the majority of people regarding the business world's seeking to have relationships with politics (such as the recent cases of the massage case of the cabinet minister, entertainment scandals, and political contributions). People think that when businesses and government officials have a certain relationship, that relationship is a sort of collusion, resulting in severe harm on people's privileges and benefits. A certain outline of this phenomenon can be gleaned from the research results. Thus, the many bills resulting from politics-business relationships: lobbying law, political contribution law, purchasing law, information transparency law, and the profit avoidance law and such other laws that call for transparency should be quickly passed and fully implemented. Only in this way will the establishment of a politics-business network be given legitimacy (in accordance with the spirit of institutional theory). Moreover, the media's insistence on the principle of reporting the truth will continue to be exercised. Therefore, investors can approve of the relationship between business and government bodies, giving it space for rationalization, and accepting the development toward the normality of the relationship between business and government entities in conformity with legal standards.
期刊論文
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會議論文
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研究報告
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學位論文
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圖書
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其他
1.薛承泰(2004)。老人照顧老人 將是臺灣現象,http://ntu.edu.tw/~psc_news9312/120701.htm, 20041207。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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