荷蘭東印度公司於1624年在臺灣建立商業據點，作為日本外貿市場的供應者之一，嘗試由東南亞各國進口鹿皮。他們發現，在臺灣向原住民收購鹿皮，不若暹羅有體制性阻礙。公司嘗試取代臺灣唐人商販地位與日本朱印船商競爭。雖然鹿皮貿易價值佔當地中日貿易總額不多，卻被當成立足大員港的正當性來源。荷日商人競爭迅速惡化，於1628年造成衝突。公司與日本之交易中斷。德川幕府在1634年起發佈鎖國命令禁止日人出境，並選擇基督教荷蘭人為交易伙伴，終止與西、葡天主教徒交往後，才改變局勢。在暹日人於山田長政帶領下，掌握鹿皮出口。1628年，山田捲入頌曇王過世後的宮廷鬥爭，打斷暹羅鹿皮出口，帶動臺灣鹿皮聲勢。1628至1632年間，臺灣當局容許在日唐人經營此一貿易，臺灣鹿皮之利潤逐漸追上暹羅鹿皮。1634年貿易局勢大變，公司當局決意大肆擴張臺灣鹿皮出口，遂數次征討中部原住民部落，開放鹿場。暹羅鹿皮出口於1640年後回穩，荷人擴張動力亦弛。大約1645年「村落承包制」設立，削減唐人與原住民接觸的同時，提供相當數量鹿皮。本文藉由釐清公司於臺灣發展鹿皮貿易的早期經緯，主張此一貿易有三項作用：作為暹羅鹿皮之補充、正當性的來源，並隔離公司官員及其所轄唐人以外的買主，與原住民接觸。

In 1624, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) set up a trading post at a fort built on a sandbank extending out from the west coast of Taiwan (Formosa). As a new supplier in the Japanese market, the VOC attempted to import deerskins from Southeast Asian kingdoms. Unlike those imported from Siam, deerskins brought from the aborigines in Taiwan were exempted from official trade barriers between Siam and Japan. The VOC wasted no time trying to take over from the Chinese middlemen deerskin trade with the aborigines in Taiwan and compete with Japanese junk traders who held a Shogunal pass to visit Taiwan. Although deerskins accounted for an insignificant percentage of the total Sino-Japanese trade volume, their trade became a token of legitimacy for the Dutch's sole control over the Tayouan harbor. The competition between Dutch and Japanese traders soon spiraled out of control and led to a violent conflict in 1628. All VOC businesses in Japan were suspended until 1633, when the Dutch were preferred to the Iberians by the Japanese Shogun because they were Protestant and not prone to proselytize their religion. The following year, the Japanese Shogunal court implemented a total exclusion policy forbidding Japanese to travel abroad. Deerskin exports from Siam had been in the firm grip of the Japanese community there until their leader, Yamada Nagamasa, became embroiled in the political strife following the death of King Songt'am in 1628. This political turmoil stalled Siamese deerskin exports, leaving a vacuum for Taiwanese deerskins to fill. From 1628 to 1632, the VOC authorities in Taiwan, with no access to the Japanese market, allowed the Chinese in Japan to engage in deerskin trade. Gradually, the profits made from Taiwanese deerskin exports were comparable to those from Siam. When the exclusion policy took effect in 1634 and the VOC trade with Japan resumed, the Siamese deerskin exports never recovered their previous level. Seeing an opportunity, the VOC determined to expand its Taiwanese deerskin exports. It launched a series of expeditions to aboriginal villages on the northern frontier to open deer hunting-grounds to Chinese hunters. The Siamese deerskin exports eventually stabilized in the early 1640s and the impetus of the VOC expansion slackened off accordingly. Around 1645, a new system to collect deerskins was established by the VOC authorities. This so-called ＂village-lease＂ system guaranteed keeping the Chinese-Aborigine contact to a minimum, while still providing the VOC with a certain amount of deerskins at a fixed price. Tracing the history of deerskin trade initiated by the VOC in Taiwan, the author argues that it served three purposes: to supplement Siamese deerskins, to establish the legitimacy of VOC's control over Tayouan harbor, and to have exclusive access to the aborigines and all their goods.