央行獨立性之治理機制雖成功穩定物價，並帶領全球經濟經歷幾次重大金融事件。金融危機挑戰央行治理機制，使近年央行獨立性風險上升。因此除了物價穩定目標之外，央行金融穩定政策架構須重新整備，以符合社會期待並減少制度過度負擔。本研究以Heckman（1979）兩階段估計法，以內因性觀點探討央行獨立性決定因子，並驗證央行獨立性改革之金融穩定效果。研究結果發現，債務比率越低、政府支出比率越高、政府收入比率越低、政府誠信越低國家，越傾向提高央行獨立性。獨立性相對低國家，若提高央行獨立性，金融穩定性會提高。獨立性較高國家，若降低央行獨立性，增加行政介入，金融穩定性效果則不明確。

The governance mechanism underlying central bank independence has successfully stabilized prices and overcome several major events in the global economy. However, the financial crisis has challenged the central bank governance mechanism, which has recently increased the risk of central bank independence. Therefore, in addition to meeting the goal of price stability, existing financial stability policy frameworks for central bank must be reorganized to meet social expectations and reduce overburden on the system. This study applies Heckman(1979) two-stage estimation method to explore the determinants of central bank independence from an endogeneity perspective and verify the effects of central bank independence reforms on financial stability. Our study reveals that countries with a low government debt ratio, a high government expenditure ratio, a low government revenue ratio, and low government integrity are more likely to increase central bank independence. If countries with a relatively low degree of central bank independence increase central bank independence, financial stability is likely to increase accordingly. By contrast, if countries with a high degree of central bank independence reduce central bank independence and increase administrative intervention, the effects of financial stability are less clear.