中共談判行為一直是我們所深深關切的題目。本篇論文便是從不同的個案切入，對中共在不同時期的談判行為作比較研究。我們選擇「國共內戰談判」（從西安事變到國共合作階段，當時中共屬於弱勢）、「韓戰停戰談判」、「中共與美國大使級會談」、「一九七○年代以季辛吉為代表的中共與美國接觸」、「中共—緬甸邊界談判」、「閩獅漁事件」以及「臺商在大陸投資經驗」等各個個案進行分析，發現中共在弱的時候與在強的時候，所展現出的行為完全不同。一九三○年代的國共談判，中共處處委曲求全，是以小博大的談判典型。當中共在五○年代初與美國接觸時，它表現出十足的意識型態好戰色彩。可是在中共與緬甸談判時，它卻又展現出標準的「雙贏」談判範例。 本文也用談判分析的解析光譜為各個談判個案定位。在定位時我們發現，臺海兩岸功能性談判應是對抗性最弱的談判，可是由於兩岸之間的猜忌，使得談判無法完全以非零和的「解決問題」形態出現。如何建立兩岸互信，並學習中共充分事前準備的態度（這是中共在不同談判行為中所展現的一貫特色），此為我們今後的努身的重點。

This paper is concerned about Communist Chinese negotiating behavior. After investigated seven different cases, namely, the KMT-CCP wartime negotiations in the late 1930s, the Korean Peninsula truce talks in the early 1950s, the PRC-USA Ambassadorial talks in the mid-1950s, PRC-USA rapprochement in the 1970s, PRC-Burma border talks in the 1960s, cross-Taiwan Straits fishery boat incident of 1991, and the Taiwanese businessmen trade talks experiences in mainland China in the late 1980s, we found that there is no such thing as an uniform Communist Chinese negotiating style. Communist Chinese demonstrated several different behavior patterns when dealing with different parties. When the Communists were in a weak position, such as in the wartime negotiation with the Nationalists, they really knew how to make concessions and always kept in a low profile to prevent themselves from been suppressed. When they gradually gained self-confidence, their negotiating style also change from humble to arrogant. When they first entered the Ambassadorial talks with the Americans, their behavior was quite militant and revolutionary, and skillfully employed the agenda tactics. But in the 1970s, when the Sino-American rapprochement started, the Communist became humble again, using their “inability” as an excuse for not making any concessions, and put emphasis on personal relations with American counterpart in order to from alliance from the within. When they negotiated with the third world countries, if these countries were not a threat to China, they played the role of a benign great power. Negotiation with Burma was a typical example in this regard. Negotiation was not a means of problem-solving but of national image-polishing. Finally, when negotiated with Taiwan on functional issues such as fishery boat disputes or negotiated with Taiwanese businessmen on trade and investment issues, we found that suspicions still existed between Taiwan and Mainland. Although the negotiating behavior the mainland Chinese demonstrated now was different from the CCP behavior in the wartime period, still, the game was not a clear positive-sum one. How to build up mutual trust, and make the future cross-straits talks a win-win begotiation, is therefore a goal that demand our endeavor.