本文利用產權制度的理論架構，探討三百多年來臺灣原住民土地產權的演
變歷程。以原住民土地產權共有的基本特性為出發點，逐步分析各階段中
共有產權制度解構的原因，以及轉向另一種產權制度型態的變動過程，與
引發的各項調整成本。同時，本文以利益團體之間武力衝突的區位，定義
邊界線，作為衡量產權制度鬆動的依據。並根據邊界線移動的走勢及型態
，觀察產權制度的演化過程。於此，本文得到下列幾點結論：1、 臺灣原
住民土地所有權面臨解構的壓力，是基於土地資源的價值有新的衡量標準
，於是改變了利用效率的傳統模式。當然，這衡量標準仍然不脫離經濟學
中的相對價格原則，同時，商業機會及市場經濟的活絡，都可能促成資源
利用效率的改變。2、 造成土地相對價格變化的因素-技術進步與人口壓
力等，除了影響土地從狩獵走向農業的生產結構，提昇土地產能外，所造
成的經濟制度變遷與所得重分配效果亦是一個值得重視的議題。3、 本文
以邊界內、邊界上的分析方法，取代過往的生、熟「番」分類標準，以凸
顯產權制度變動對原住民土地流失的意義。4、 因制度變動而造成原住民
土地流失，然而土地流失所可能引發的武力對立關係與衝突，卻因時代、
環境、族群差異、執政者立場不同而大異其趣。5、 新產權制度的建立由
相關利益團體共同決定。其中勢力相對較大的政府參與度，足以影響整個
土地產權的調整走勢。當政府選擇參與的程度越小，對立的兩利益團體共
同決定產權制度的功能越強，反之則越弱。影響政府參與度大小的主因，
在於政府選定政策目標後的成本效益評估。因此，政府政策目標影響產權
制度的調整。6、 政策對產權制度影響具有跨期作用，如通事與社商自荷
領時代建立並沿用到清代，角色卻從中介者演變成影響邊界上土地產權制
度變動的關鍵因子之一；隘勇自清設立並沿用到日治時代，卻從避免「番
」害擴大的防衛者立場，轉化到積極征討挑起「番」害的戰備組織。顯示
政府政策的執行方式，比法令建立的表象型態，更具有實質且深刻的影響
效果。

Using the theory of Property Right, we study the change of the
land ownership of Taiwanese aborigines in the past three hundred
years. We study the deformation of the property right
institution of Taiwanese aborigines and the cost of the change
from the tribal common property right to another systsystem in
Various colonial periods. By using "frontiers" (the fighting
areas between different interest groups), whose locations
provide informationfor analyzing the change of tribal
properties, we measure the change of property right institution.
Six conclusions are as follows. 1. Because
different measure of land value had altered the traditional
pattern of land use, the original property right institution
faced the threat of deformation.
2. Reasons, such as the improvement of technologyand the growth
of population, which increase the relative price ofland lead to
the change of land use from hunting to agriculture. The
changeenhances land productivity and re-allocate income which
are worthy of furtherstudies.3. In the text we use "frontiers"
instead ofthe traditional sheng fan and shu fan, to emphasize
the influence of change of property right on the land loss of
Taiwanese aborigines. 4. Time, environment,
tribal varieties,and ruler''s policies lead to various kinds of
conflicts caused by land loss.5. New institution of property
rightis decided by all interest groups involvedthe new
institution would be decided collaboratively by opposed interest
groups. The degree of governmental participation is based on
the magnitude of benefit gained from governmental policies.
Therefore, governmental policies affect the changeof institution
of property right.6. Governmental policieshave intertemporal
influence. For example, the tong shi and shang sheestablished
in the 17th century during the Dutch Age and continuously
usethrough the Qing dynasty, served at first as intermediaries,
butgradually played critical roles in the change of property
right. Another example is found in the Ai army system,
established in the Qing and used throughout the Japanese
colonial period. The function of the Ai army was transformed
from a defensive troop guarding the Taiwanese aboriginesto an
offensive army attacking thd e aboriginal tribes. The examples
indicatethat the actual execution of governmental policies is
more important than the policies themselves.