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題名：資訊不對稱下股票購回策略與公司治理機制運作關聯性之研究
作者：許月瑜 引用關係
作者(外文)：Yueh-Yu Hsu
校院名稱：國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱：管理研究所博士班
指導教授：吳欽杉
李春安
學位類別：博士
出版日期：2004
主題關鍵詞：資訊揭露；公司治理；不對稱資訊；股票購回；corporate governance；stock repurchases；asymmetric information
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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本文探討資訊不對稱狀況下，公司董事會採取之庫藏股票購回策略與所選擇之公司治理機制運作間，是否存在關聯性？因為國內庫藏股制度實施期間尚短，而國外雖行之有年，但多數研究主題皆將焦點置於股票購回宣告訊息發射後之短、長期股價績效表現，鮮少討論在資訊不對稱下，公司股票購回策略與治理機制運作選擇間是否存在關聯，特別是極少研究公司採取「不完全購回」策略時，對整體均衡之影響。
因此，本研究乃利用賽局模型分析不同品質型態公司於擬定公司股票購回策略前，是否預先選擇能揭露不同資訊透明度的公司治理機制運作？同時分析當市場小股東對公司價值攸關資訊掌握完全資訊及不完全資訊兩種情況下，不同品質型態公司所採取的公司治理機制運作與股票購回策略是否有所不同？是否有公司可能採取偏離均衡的「不完全購回」策略？希望經由以上問題深入探討，瞭解資訊不對稱下之公司股票購回策略是否存在代理問題，並從而找出能提供主管機關制定相關法令參考之經濟意涵，以極大社會總體福祉。
模型結果可以解釋，雖然市場小股東對公司價值握有不完全資訊，且證交法第28-2條亦僅規定公司股票購回時應揭露資訊之最低門檻，但是公司進行股票購回宣告時，通常會事先選擇較嚴謹的公司治理機制運作，即自願對市場小股東揭露超越證期會法規標準之更多公司攸關資訊，同時並採取「完全購回」股票策略。
This paper explores the relations between stock repurchases and choice of corporate governance arrangements under asymmetric information. Although a large number of studies have been made on stock repurchases, much ink has been spent on performance after share buybacks, only a few studies have ever tried to discuss the relations between stock repurchases and choice of corporate governance arrangements under asymmetric information. So far, little attempts have been made at the subject of how incomplete buybacks affects the candidate pooling equilibrium.
To see the intuition, we constructed models to illustrate the optimal corporate governance arrangement respecting disclosure transparency which board of directors takes before share repurchases. Also, this paper examined if two different types of firms will take the same corporate governance arrangements and share repurchases strategies under asymmetric/symmetric information conditions? Would asymmetric profile lead to an outcome that the firm chooses to deviate from the prescription? Would it cause the firm to take incomplete buybacks strategies unilaterally? Exploring these questions, the findings of sequential analysis may help better understand if the share repurchases strategies under asymmetric information generate agency problems? Therefore, the object of this study is to discover the important economic implications for government to formulate efficient rules and laws to maximize social wealth.
As the models described, the results can help identify that asymmetric information might lead firms to adopt a specified corporate governance arrangement that is known to be efficient both by public shareholders and the repurchases decision-making board of directors. Our findings also have direct implications for government to formulate an information disclosure rule, which shows that firms may take a strict corporate governance arrangement voluntarily to disclosure more transparent information than Article 28-2 of Taiwan Stock and Exchange Law’s requirement and to complete the share repurchases program as well.
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