政治預算循環的理論假設政府會於選舉年採取擴張性的財政政策，增加政府支出，或是調降稅課收入，營造經濟繁榮的景象，以獲取民眾的支持。本文欲藉由政治景氣循環理論觀察我國中英政府在制定相關的財政政策時是否有選舉因素的考量，而偏好操控某些特定的財政政策工具。實證結果發現，在財政支出工具的檢驗模型當中，我們得到統計上相當顯著支持的證據，特別是解嚴之後的選舉年，臺灣明顯存在政治預算循環的行為；而在財政收入工具的檢驗模型當中，僅有稅課收入中的貨物稅模型達到統計上的顯著水準。我們發現臺灣的執政當局不僅偏好支出工具的採用，也偏好某些稅課收入工具的使用，不過收入工具在操控上顯然不及支出工具來的直接而且便利。

Political budget cycle theory assumes that before the election, the incumbents will adopt expansionary policies, such as more government spending and less tax revenue, which make the economy performance appear prosperous, to gain voters support. The main purpose of this paper is to observe if fiscal policy making is associated with elections, and if the government adopts a certain fiscal policy tools in order to attract constituents, attention. On the test model of government spending tools, significant evidence has been discovered in support of the political budget cycle in Taiwan, especially in the election years after martial law ended. On the test model of government revenue tools, the relevance merely shows in commodity tax model. To sum up, the incumbents not only adopt government spending tools but also government revenue tools even thought the manipulation of revenue tools is not as direct and convenient as that of spending tools.