本文試圖引介有關定型化契學條款規制之若干法律濟分析觀點。傳統觀點認為，使用定型化契約條款之一方當事人，在經濟上具有獨占地位或優勢的協商地位，致他方無從表示意見，而僅能接受或不接受，因此應當加以規制。相對的，較新的觀點認為，交易成本與資訊不對稱所導致的市場失靈才是規制定型化契約條款的原因。其次，一方當事人依定型化契約條款所作的規定是否顯失公平，亦得藉助所謂完整契約的觀點加以具體化，亦即定型化契約條款所作之規定與假設零交易成本下，當事人可能達成之協達內容，是否有所差異，且致他方當事人遭受不利，例如使用定型化契約條款之一方，實際係能以較低成本預防或得以保險等方式分散相關風險之人，卻仍依定型化契約條款將契約風險歸諸相對人之情形。

In this paper some points of views developed by economists related to standard form contract are introduced. According to the traditional approach, the monopoly or superior bargain power of users of standard form contracts is the critical point which makes the control of standard form contracts necessary. However, some proponents of the legal and economic approach suggest that such a view is unrealistic, and in reality, transaction costs, information asymmetry and market failure are reasons why standard form contract should be controlled by law. In order to answer the second question it is suggested that the court should make inquiries into what a fully specified contract would reach under zero transaction costs. In this type of contract, parties to the contract would allocate related risks to the party who is the more efficient risk bearer. If the supplier’s standard form contract shifts related risks which he should bear as required for efficacy to the other party of the contract, it is quite possible that supplier’s standard form contract would be banned by the court.