藉由歐盟與臺灣的案例比較，本文嘗試探究法域競爭如何造成最低資本總額限制（Minimum capital requirements，下稱「最低資本制」）的降低或廢除。詳言之，本文分析企業可於任一法域設立登記（incorporation）的選擇可能性，係如何對在地立法者或管制機關帶來法域競爭的壓力。此法域競爭接著如何影響公司法制的改革，尤其是最低資本制的放寬或廢除。本文主張，法域競爭對歐盟及臺灣形成的改革壓力，最終均促成最低資本制的鬆綁。更重要者，臺灣的案例彰顯出，世界銀行此種國際發展機構（international development agency）透過自2003年起每年出版的全球經商（doing business）報告，實際上正持續地推動國際法域競爭。本文以為，此種法域競爭迫使我國政府特別在2009年廢止最低資本額之公司法規定；殊值注意者，全球經商報告推動世界各國加入法域競爭之催化力量，實類於歐洲法院判決對歐盟各國公司法所帶來的改革壓力。另關於國際法域競爭對我國公司法制的其他啟示，本文將提出淺見，闡述我國票面金額股制度之改革芻議。

This paper explores how jurisdictional competition contributed to the reduction or abolishment of minimum capital requirements. Specifically, this paper analyzes how the ability to choose the jurisdiction of incorporation has posed a competitive threat to local legislators or regulators, by comparing the European Union (”EU”) and Taiwan. It continues to explain how jurisdictional competition affected company law reforms, particularly the reduction or abolition of minimum capital requirements while arguing that the pressure of jurisdictional competition drove the EU and Taiwan toward the liberalization of minimum capital requirements. More importantly, the case of Taiwan demonstrates that the World Bank, through its annual ”Doing Business” reports, have been promoting international jurisdictional competition. This paper asserts that this jurisdictional competition arguably compelled Taiwan to abolish the statutory minimum capital in 2009. In particular, the way the World Bank instills a sense of jurisdictional competition as countries engage in regulatory reforms is similar to how the European Court of Justice sparked European chater competition, which thereafter contributed to the liberalization of minimum capital requirements across EU members. Also, this paper, from a perspective of international jurisdictional competition, elaborates on probable reforms of par value rules in Taiwan.