過去主要植基於美國市場的薪酬研究發現，董事會／薪酬委員會會調整決定高階主管薪酬時所依據的報導盈餘數字。其中一項作法，即為將具有價值創造涵意之活動支出自盈餘數字中抽離，予以調降薪酬權數，俾降低管理者薪酬受到該項對公司長期有利之活動的負面影響。針對新興市場－臺灣，本研究鑑於資產減損項目之重大經濟意義以及認列決策上潛在的代理問題，第一個目的係植基於最適契約觀點，檢測董事會是否會降低高階管理團隊薪酬對資產減損的敏感度。其次，高階管理者對董事會具有影響力往往為臺灣新興市場之特性，而該特性將衝擊薪酬設計的有效性。因此，本研究進一步檢視是否該資產減損薪酬權數之調降程度會隨著管理者權力增加而增加。採用臺灣上市櫃公司2005－2010年的資料進行實證分析，我們發現資產減損項目對高階管理團隊薪酬的負面衝擊會受到調降。此外，我們尤其發現該調降程度會隨管理者權力增加而增加。整體而言，本研究之證據顯示：臺灣上市櫃公司之高階管理團隊薪酬設計並非完全來自最適契約觀點，而和管理者權力亦有關。

Much prior research has documented that boards of directors or compensation committees often adjust specific earnings components when setting the earnings-based compensation of top management teams (TMTs). When an earnings-decreasing component is related to a value-creating activity, the board would reduce the compensation weight on this component, so as to lead managers to put greater emphasis on the firms' long-term prospects. However, this compensation adjustment decision may diverge from the optimal adjustment level if top managers have a significant influence on the board of directors. This is a particularly common phenomenon in Taiwan, an emerging country with weak corporate governance relative to the U.S. Focusing on ”asset write-down” which has a significantly negative effect on earnings and book value, we first examine whether boards of directors in Taiwan reduce the sensitivity of TMT members' pay to a loss on asset write-down. Next, we examine whether the sensitivity-reducing effect increases with the degree of the TMT's power. Using a sample of Taiwan's publicly traded firms over the period 2005-2010, we find that the annual pay of TMT members is less sensitive to the loss on asset write-down than to the reported earnings. In addition, we find that the sensitivity of TMT's pay to asset write-downs is particularly low for powerful TMTs. Overall, this study provides evidence that the design of TMT members' compensation is not only associated with the optimal contracting perspective, but also with the managerial power perspective.