近年來，各國對外投資多採取多層級的複雜跨國股權控制結構；以臺灣為例，2015年臺灣上市公司的海外關係企業由臺灣母公司直接控制的僅占22.24%，高達77.76%的海外關係企業係由中介分支機構所持有。而此現象,多被各國租稅當局視為用以利潤移轉及稅基侵蝕的安排。本研究遂以2001年至2015年臺灣上市公司在79國新設的9,789家關係企業為樣本，利用mixed logit模型，探討利潤移轉租稅誘因及反誘因變數對跨國企業設立海外關係企業區位選擇的影響。本文不僅首度檢視地主國移轉訂價規範及資本弱化條款的實施是否影響臺灣上市公司新設關係企業的海外區位選擇；更在現有文獻之上，進一步探討租稅協定及漁獵租稅協定對跨國企業區位選擇的影響。最後，透過反事實分析，檢視臺灣上市公司在各國租稅政策的變化下，所進行的區位選擇替換。由均值或固定參數的估計結果顯示，移轉訂價規範、資本弱化規範及租稅協定的簽署都屬於利潤移轉的租稅反誘因，會降低臺灣上市公司在該區位新設關係企業的機率。相對的，免稅天堂或具有廣泛租稅協定網絡是跨國公司從事利潤移轉的租稅誘因，會增加臺灣上市公司新設關係企業的機率。此外，反事實分析模擬的結果發現，當「兩岸租稅協議」生效後，中國將會流失29.51個百分點的新設關係企業，新設關係企業的地點將轉向香港、日本、南韓、美國及印度等地。最後，模擬各國單邊降低稅率15%，發現美國2017年年底的租稅改革對臺灣上市公司選擇美國作為新設關係企業的區位之吸引力並不如中國、香港、及日本降稅的結果。

Over the past few years, foreign investment in many countries has adopted multi-level, complex, multinational ownership control structures. In Taiwan in 2015, for example, only 22.24% of overseas subsidiaries of Taiwanese listed companies were controlled by Taiwan's parent companies, and up to 77.76% of overseas subsidiaries were held by intermediary affiliates. This phenomenon is often viewed by tax authorities in various countries as an arrangement for profit shifting which leads to tax base erosion. In this study, we adopt a mixed logit method, with the sample of 9,789 new subsidiaries of Taiwan's listed companies from 2001 to 2015, located in 79 countries, to explore the influence of tax incentives relevant to profit shifting on the overseas location choice of multinational corporations. This project is the first to examine whether the implementation of transfer pricing or capital thinning provisions of the host country can affect the location choice of Taiwan's subsidiaries, and it is also the first in the literature to explore the effect of bilateral tax treaties or treaty shopping on the location choice. Finally, through counterfactual analysis, we estimate the relative change in the probability of location choice due to relevant scenarios of tax policy changes in in various countries. Estimation results of the mean or fixed coefficients show that transfer pricing rules, capital thinning regulation and signature of a bilateral tax treaty with Taiwan are all disincentives for profit shifting, reducing the chances of Taiwanese listed companies establishing new subsidiaries in the country. In contrast, a tax haven or an extensive network of tax treaty agreements is a tax incentive for corporations to make profit transfers and increases the chances of establishing a new subsidiary. The results of counterfactual analysis predict that after the bilateral tax treaty with Taiwan comes into effect, China will lose 29.51 percentage points of all the newly established subsidiaries of Taiwan's multination corporations, mainly to Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, the United States and India. Finally, by simulating a unilateral reduction of tax rates by 15%in each country, we find that the attraction of the tax reform in the United States towards the end of 2017 to Taiwan's listed companies in choosing the United States as a new subsidiary is disadvantageous to the same tax cuts implemented in China, Hong Kong and Japan.