:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:論高達美與後期維根斯坦哲學中語言與實在的關係
作者:陶嘉代 引用關係
作者(外文):Jia-Dai Tau
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
指導教授:陳榮華
楊金穆
學位類別:博士
出版日期:2012
主題關鍵詞:高達美後期維根斯坦語言實在哲學Gadamerlater Wittgensteinlanguagerealityphilosophy
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:52
語言與實在的關係是哲學研究的基礎,對語言與實在關係的哲學研究則具體落實哲學不遺漏自身基礎之深入反省的目標。本文主要根據《真理與方法》與《論確定性》,評析高達美與後期維根斯坦對此議題的可能貢獻。為了對這兩位哲學背景、用字譴詞與論述風格迥異的哲學家作出公允的比較,本文強調把握他們哲學取向的重要性。哲學取向是哲學家使用其哲學論述的方式,而這決定其哲學論述的確切意義。為此,本文採取以下論述方式:首先致力於從《真理與方法》與《論確定性》各自處理的哲學問題與處理方式分別握他們的哲學取向,繼而貼合著他們各自的哲學取向來探查《真理與方法》與《論確定性》對於本文論題的可能貢獻,最後才以本文論題為中心對於這些貢獻進行直接比較。
經由以上論述方式,本文研究結果如下:《真理與方法》在理論式哲學取向下,對於本文論題提出的貢獻是---語言與實在在問與答的對話中,具有原初的統一或一致性關係。《論確定性》在治療式哲學取向下,對於本文論題提出的貢獻是---語言與實在在客觀確信的語言行為或實踐中,具有原初的統一或一致性關係。《真理與方法》與《論確定性》對於本文論題的共同主論點是:語言與實在具有原初的統一關係;亦即語言本身是夠好的,能夠向我們呈現或開顯出實在。在此共同主論點下,他們的一個共同關切或目標是:在語言使用上,向本身夠好的語言盡可能地保持開放與不獨斷。本文認為,相較於《真理與方法》在理論式哲學取向下所提出的問與答的對話,《論確定性》在治療式哲學取向下提出的客觀確信的語言行為或實踐,較能具體落實此共同關切。
The relationship between language and reality is a fundamental issue in philosophy. This dissertation tries to analyze and compare Gadamer’s and the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical contributions on this issue. The main reference in this study is composed of two important works of them: Truth and Method and On Certainty. Since these two philosophies are diverse in academic background, vocabularies and style, it turns out to be important to grasp their philosophical approaches which, I think, serve as the foundations of their philosophies. My research method is a three-step process, (i) by an investigation of Truth and Method and On Certainty, to define their philosophical approaches by way of an analysis on the fundamental questions they deal with, and the responses they maintain. (ii), I examine their philosophical contributions in the thesis of the relationship between of language and reality. (iii), I give a comparison of their contributions.
The findings underline that Gadamer’s philosophical approach is theoretical, and that of later Wittgenstein is therapeutic. The former approach justifies that: in the dialogue of questions and answers, language and reality are in a primordial unity; while the latter justifies that: in the objective certainty of linguistic practice, language and reality are in a primordial unity. Their common conclusion is: language and reality are in a primordial unity, i.e., language is good enough to disclose reality to us. According to this conclusion their common concern would be: to keep open and undogmatic as far as possible in the use of language. In my conclusion I argue that, in contrast to Gadamer’s theoretical approach of dialogue of question and answer, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach of linguistic practice is more satisfactory in the working out of their common concern.
參考書目
I. 外文部分

Bacon, F. (2000). The New Organon, trans. L. Jardine & M. Silverthorne. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Baker, G. P., & Hacker, P. M. S. (1980). Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
------- (1983). Wittgenstein, Meaning and Understanding: essays on the Philosophical Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
------- (2004). Wittgenstein''s Method: neglected aspects, ed. K. J. Morris. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.
Bernstein, R. J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: science, hermeneutics, and praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Cavell, S. (1976). Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Descartes, R. (1991). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------- (2006). A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One''s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, trans. I. Maclean. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dilman, I. (1998). Language and Reality Modern Perspectives On Wittgenstein. Leuven: Peeters.
------- (2002). Wittgenstein''s Copernican Revolution : the question of linguistic idealism. New York: Palgrave.
Dostal, R. J. (2002). The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Frege, G. (1948). Sense and Reference. [Journal Article]. Philosophical Review. 57 (3):209-230.
Gadamer, H. -G. (1976). Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. & trans. D. E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press.
------- (1980a). Dialog and Dialectic : eight hermeneutical studies on Plato. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
------- (1980b). The Eminent Text and Its Truth [Journal Article]. The Bulletin of the Midwest Modern Language Association , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), 3-10.
------- (1981). Reason in the Age of Science, trans. F. G. Lawrence. MIT-PR : Cambridge.
------- (1985-1995). Gesammelte Werke, 10 vols., Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr
------- (1986). The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other essays, trans. N. Walker, ed. R. Bernasconi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------- (1996). Truth and Method, tans. J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, New York: Continuum.
------- (1997). The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. L. E. Hahn. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court.
------- (2002). The Beginning of Knowledge, trans. R. Coltman. Continuum : New York.
------- (2003). A Century of Philosophy, trans. R. Dottori. New York: Continuum.
Glock, H.-J. (1996). A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell Reference.
------- (2004). Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher? [Journal Article]. Metaphilosophy. Jl, 35(4), 419-444.
Grondin, J.(2003). The Philosophy of Gadamer, trans. K. Plant. Chesham: Acumen.
Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Insight and Illusion : themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
------- (1997). Wittgenstein''s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
------- (2001). ‘Philosophy’ in Wittgenstein: a critical reader, ed. H. -J. Glock. MA: Blackwell Publishers, 233-347.
------- (2004). Wittgenstein : connections and controversies. New York: Clarendon press.
------- (2010). ‘Meaning and Use’ in The later Wittgenstein on Language, ed. D. Whiting. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 26-44.
Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1963.
------- (1977). Being and Time, trans. J.M. Anderson & E. Robinson, New York: Harper.
Hintikka, M. B., & Hintikka, J. (1986). Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Horn, P. R. (2005). Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the Unity of language: reality and discourse without metaphysics. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Husserl, E. (1913) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy—First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff 1982 (= Ideas).
Hutchinson, P. (2007). What''s the Point of Elucidation? [Journal Article]. Metaphilosophy (691-713), O 2007.
Johnston, P. (1989). Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Kenny, A. J. P. (2006). Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell Pub.
Kern, Andrea (2004). ‘Understanding Scepticism’ in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, ed. D. McManus. New York: Routledge, 200-217.
Kripke, S. A. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: an elementary exposition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Kuusela, O. (2005). From Metaphysics and Philosophical Theses to Grammar: Wittgenstein''s Turn. [Journal Article]. Philosophical Investigations. Ap, 28(2), 95-133.
------ (2006). Do the Concepts of Grammar and Use in Wittgenstein Articulate a Theory of Language or Meaning? [Journal Article]. Philosophical Investigations. O, 29(4), 309-341.
------- (2008). The Struggle against Dogmatism : Wittgenstein and the concept of philosophy. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.
Lawn, C. (2004). Wittgenstein and Gadamer : towards a post-analytic philosophy of language. New York: Continuum.
Malcolm, N. (1986). Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein''s criticism of his early thought. Oxford, OX, UK: Blackwell.
McGinn, M. (1989). Sense and Certainty : a dissolution of scepticism. Oxford: B. Blackwell.
Mill, J. S. (1873). System der Deductiven und Inductiven Logik : eine Darlegung der Grundsatze der Beweislehre und der Methoden wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Leipzig: Fues.
------- (1936). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. New York: Longmans, Green.
Minar, E. (2005). ‘On Wittgenstein’s Response to Scepticism: the Opening of On Certainty’ in Readings of Wittgenstein''s On Certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moore, G. E. (1925). ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ in Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series), ed. J. H. Muirhead. Allen and Unwin, London, 193-223. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers and in G. E. Moore: selected writings, 106-33.
------- (1939). Proof of an External World. [Journal Article]. Proceedings of the British Academy 25, 273-300. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers and in G. E. Moore: selected Writings, 147-70.
------- (1993). Selected writings, ed. T. Baldwing. New York, NY: Routledge.
Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004). ‘On Certainty and the Grammaticalization of Experience’ in The Third Wittgenstein : the post-Investigations works, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock. Burlington, V.T.: Ashgate, 43-62.
------- (2005). ‘Unraveling certainty’ in Readings of Wittgenstein''s On Certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W.H. Brenner, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 76-99.
------- (2009). Introduction to Proceedings Issue of The Third Wittgenstein. [Journal Article]. Philosophia 37 (4): 557-62.
Mueller-Vollmer, K. (2011), ‘Wilhelm von Humboldt’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, URL = .
Mulhall, S. (2003). ‘Stanley Cavell’s Vision of the Normativity of Language: Grammar, Criteria, and Rules’ in Stanley Cavell, ed. R. T. Eldridge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 79-106.
Pitchard, D. (2005). ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism’ in Readings of Wittgenstein''s On certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pitcher, G. (1964). The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Pole, D. (1958). The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein: a short introduction with an epilogue on John Wisdom. London: Athlone Press.
Ringma, C. (1999). Gadamer''s Dialogical Hermeneutic: the hermeneutics of Bultmann, of the New Testament sociologists and of the social theologians in dialogue with Gadamer''s hermeneutic. Heidelberg : C. Winter.
Risser, J. (1997). Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: re-reading Gadamer''s philosophical hermeneutics. Suny-Pr: Albany.
Scheibler, I. (2000). Gadamer: between Heidegger and Habermas. Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Schmidt, L. K. (2006). Understanding Hermeneutics. Stocksfield: Acumen.
Strawson, P. F. (1971). Logico-linguistic Papers. London: Methuen.
Stroll, A. (1994). Moore and Wittgenstein On Certainty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wachterhauser, B. R. (1994). Hermeneutics and Truth. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
------ (1999). Beyond Being: Gadamer''s post-platonic hermeneutical ontology. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
Weinsheimer, J. C. (1985). Gadamer''s Hermeneutics. Yale-Univ-Pr: New Haven.
Wittgenstein, L.(1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden. London: Routlege & Kegan Paul.
------- (1953). Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: B. Blackwell.
------- (1958). Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations" : generally known as the Blue and Brown books. New York: Harper and Row.
------- (1967). Zettle. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
------- (1969). On Certainty , ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Harper.
------- (1974). Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell.
------ (1976). Wittgenstein''s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939 : from the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
------- (1979). Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35, ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford: Blackwell.
------- (1980). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology , vol.1 , ed G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
------- (1993). Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, ed. J. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hacket Pub. Co.
Williams, M. (2004). ‘Refutation of idealism’ in Wittgenstein and Scepticism, ed. D. McManus. New York: Routledge, 76-96.
------- (2005). ‘Why Wittgenstein Isn’t Foundationalist’ in Readings of Wittgenstein''s On Certainty, ed. D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 47-58.
Wright, C. (1985). ‘Facts and Certainty’ in Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. LXXI, 429-472.
Wright, K. (1990). Festivals of Interpretation: essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer''s work. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.

II. 中文部分

高達美 (1993),《真理與方法:哲學詮釋學的基本特徵》,洪漢鼎譯,臺北:時報文化出版公司,初版。
------- (1995),《真理與方法:補充和索引》,洪漢鼎與夏鎮平繹,臺北:時報文化出版公司,初版。
陳榮華 (1992),《海德格「存有與時間」闡釋》,臺北市:輔仁大學出版社。new window
------- (2011),《高達美詮釋學》,台北市:三民書局。
張鼎國 (2011),《詮釋與實踐》,汪文聖與洪世謙編,台北市:政大出版社。new window
維根斯坦(1992),《哲學探討》,范光棣與湯潮譯,臺北市:水牛。
------- (2003),《维特根斯坦全集》,涂纪亮主编,石家庄: 河北敎育。


 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
:::
無相關著作
 
QR Code
QRCODE