從傳統的「本人－代理人」結構觀點中，由公司股東組成之股東會向來被認為是公司權力階層中之最高意思機關，其決議不僅得拘束股東，更為公司之董事會及經營階層所遵守。在民國（以下同）九十年公司法修正前，此一「股東會至上」的觀點基本上也為我國法制所採納。惟在九十年修法中，公司法第二○二條以及其他條文的修訂加重了董事會在公司經營中的角色，並使我國公司法制由「股東會至上」轉而成「董事會中心」。而在公司治理改革中，董事會的功能與重要性也就成為最重要的課題。然而，在九十四年六月通過之最新公司法修正中，股東提案權與董事提名權明文納入公司法制。雖然此等權利的解釋與適用並未顛覆目前「董事會中心」的法制結構，但可以確定的是，如何強化股東權限又再度成為公司治理學者、專家注意的焦點。 就當前對於股東行動主義的強調以及近年來的法制變革觀之，吾人對於以公司法第二○二條所表彰之「董事會中心」的立法政策之妥當性，不能無疑。據此，本文嘗試就支持「董事會中心」的四點論據加以探討並批判，其中包括契約連鎖理論的依據，移植美國法制的正當性、決策模式的比較優勢以及股東表決權利擴張可能形式的偏差與弊端。在從我國公司法制與實務加以檢視後，本文認為，以「董事會中心」取代「股東會至上」作為權限分配的指導原則並無強有力的論據。基於此一理解，未來我國公司法制的修訂與解釋應適度回歸「股東會至上」的觀點，以求在股東會與董事會間取得一個權限分配上的最佳平衡點。

From the perspective of traditional "principal-agent" structure, the shareholders as a group is seen as the uppermost institution in the corporate hierarchy, whose resolutions are observed not only by shareholders but by the board of directors and the management. The "shareholder primacy" viewpoint was taken by Taiwan's lawmakers until Corporate Law was revised in 2001. The amendment of Article 202, among others, in the 2001 revision strengthens the board's role in the operation of corporation and marks the transition form "shareholder primacy" to "director primacy." In the ensuing corporate governance reform, the function and value of the board has surely become the most important topic. Nonetheless, recent revisions passed in May 2005 introduce the right of shareholder proposal, and the right of shareholder's access to the ballot. While interpretation and exercise of such right are not to conflict with the board-centered governance regime, it is obvious that how to reinforce shareholder's power is again the focal point of corporate governance scholars and practitioners. In view of current emphasis on shareholder activism and recent revisions relating to the allocation of powers, much doubt should be cast on the legitimacy of Article 202 and the merit of director primacy. Therefore, this article explores and criticizes four potential explanations for director primacy, including theoretical support from nexus-of-contracts theory, justification of legal borrowing from U. S., comparative advantage on decision-making model, and the voting pathologies due to the expansion of shareholder voting power. Examined against the background of Taiwan's corporate regime and practice, the director primacy, this article believes, is not warranted to replace the shareholder primacy as the guiding standard. Based on this understanding, it is suggested that corporate statutes and rules should be modified or construed toward shareholder primacy in order to strike the right balance between the power of shareholder as a group and that of the board of directors.