本文檢視臺北市社會福利政策在民進黨籍市長主政之後的發展脈絡， 發現政黨競 爭的機制的確促使地方首長積極推動與改善社會福利政策，凸顯具有政黨色彩之政策理念， 以維繫連任的契機。但是，僅有政黨競爭理論並不足以解釋臺北市社會福利發展為何超前其 他省市與縣市政府，必須納入地方自主性的觀點，從地方資源的多寡 -- 財源自主的高低、 社會福利專業人員的素質、行政首長對社會福利的重視，以及社政機構地位的提昇等因素， 方足以解釋臺北市社會福利政策的特色與限制。綜言之，政黨競爭對地方政府的社會福利政 策制定，發揮了觸媒作用；然而，福利政策的制定與執行的結果，卻相當程度取決於地方政 府的自主性，而自主性的高低則有賴地方首長與行政人員巧妙交互運用法律、政治、經濟與 財政資源。

　　　　　This paper explores the development of welfare policies in the City of Taipei from 1995 to 1996, during which the city government was ruled by the DPP's mayor, Mr,Shui-pien Chen. Then main research findings are that the existence of interparty competition did provide strong incentives for the mayor to view welfare policies highly. In order to win the re-election two years later, Mayor Chen asked city officials not only to design welfare programs that manifest the idea of the Western-style welfare state publicized by the DPP, but also to pay attention to the implementation of welfare policies. However, the factor of party competition alone cannot fully explain the unique features and constraints of welfare policies in Taipei. It is suggested that we need to consider the effects of local autonomy, i.e., the autonomy of finance, personnel, the position of the Bureau of Social Affairs, and the view point of local chiefs with respect to social welfare, on the capacity of the city government in the realization of welfare programs.