本文分析代理與競賽觀點的經理人薪酬理論，檢驗經理人個人與公司特質變數對經理層級薪酬水準與層級間薪酬差額的影響。分別以「經理人職稱高低」所代表的職務階級，以及以「經理人薪酬多寡」所代表的權力等級，來定義經理層級；而特質變數則包括經理人於經理層級中的階級、股權結構、企業風險、公司規模、獲利能力、與成立年數等因素。就171家我國上市公司之737位經理人薪酬資料進行橫斷面迴歸分析後，本文發現，由代理理論所建立的經理人薪酬水準決定因素假說，以及由競賽理論所建立的經理層級間薪酬差額決定因素假說，大致上都能獲得實證結果的支持，其中又以「經理人薪酬多寡」定義經理層級時較能反映競賽理論的內涵。

This paper provides empirical evidence about the determinants of the level of managerial compensation and of the structure of compensation within the management hierarchy. We establish the hypotheses relating the level of managerial pay and pay differentials between organizational levels to individual and firm characteristics suggested by the agency model and the tournament theory. Management hierarchy is defined in terms of position titles and the amount of compensation. The determinants emphasized here include the managerial position in the management hierarchy, ownership concentration of the firm, business risks, firm size, profitability, firm age and so on. Hypotheses are tested cross-sectionally using the data of 737 managers in 171 Taiwan's listed companies. Empirical results show that most of the predictions emerged in the theories of agency and tournaments gain support in the data, particularly when the management hierarchy is defined as the amount of compensation.