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題名:從管理者薪酬與機構法人持股之觀點看企業創新投資之影響因素
書刊名:東吳經濟商學學報
作者:李馨蘋 引用關係鄭誌偉
作者(外文):Lee, Shin-pingCheng, Scott C.
出版日期:2008
卷期:62
頁次:頁47-68
主題關鍵詞:管理者薪酬創新投資追蹤型資料之二階段最小平方法Executive compensationInnovation investmentTwo-stage least squares for panel data
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(8) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:8
  • 共同引用共同引用:33
  • 點閱點閱:45
研發支出投資不僅與未來效益產生關連,同時這樣的投入也促使管理者和股東之間產生資訊不對稱,造成所謂的代理問題。為了解決代理問題,公司股東憑藉著管理者的薪酬設計來激發管理者的誘因,促使管理者與股東之間利益一致,而不至於任意裁減公司研發支出抑制創新活動,確保公司價值的泉源。本研究主要探討企業創新投資與管理者薪酬的關連性是否存在於台灣產業中,並深入探討機構法人持股愈高時,是否會對公司產生監控效果。本研究以1995至2004年間台灣上市公司資料進行實證分析,利用追蹤型資料之二階段最小平方法來分析橫斷面與時間數列的混合資料。本研究發現管理者之短視行為確實存在,管理者為了增加個人財富、保障其人力資本,透過減少風險性的投資如R&D,來降低個人的風險承擔。然而為了使管理者能以公司利益來考量,董事會在管理者薪酬設計上,通常會將薪酬制度與創新能力互相連結來改變管理者風險趨避的傾向,來激勵管理者勇於創新。再者,機構法人也存在於短視行為,並無發揮監督效能。
This study is to examine the relationship between innovation investment and executive compensation. This model is applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market for 1995-2004. We will apply two-stage least squares for panel data. The results of the study are that executives exist in the myopia behavior. Executives may reduce corporate innovation investment and become risk-averse for increasing their welfare and protecting their human capital. In order to enable executive to consider the corporate benefit, compensation committees link innovation investment opportunities to executive compensation schemes. It encourage executive to have the courage to innovation activities. Furthermore, institution investors exist in the myopia behavior and without supervise potency.
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學位論文
1.吳淑惠(2001)。產品多角化策略與現金流量對研究發展支出影響之研究-以電子業為例。  延伸查詢new window
2.董秋梅(2000)。機構投資人對企業 R&D 活動的影響。  延伸查詢new window
 
 
 
 
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