企業與銀行的往來關係與資訊揭露政策都有降低資訊不對稱和資金成本的功能，本文想了解企業對兩政策的態度。本文提出兩個假說：替代性揭露假說和互補性揭露假說；前者認為放款關係與資訊揭露程度呈現負相關；後者則主張正相關。以2005至2010年上市櫃公司為樣本，本文發現企業資訊揭露政策符合替代性揭露假說，表示當公司有良好銀行放款關係時，因未來融資無虞及有銀行傳遞資訊，揭露政策較消極，俾降低揭露成本，但卻可能自限揭露水準，反無更佳的資訊透明度。此替代揭露行為的結果在有嚴重代理問題的家族控制企業和高股份盈餘偏離的企業中會更加明顯。此外，在考慮自願性揭露、2008年金融風暴影響以及其他多項穩健性檢查後，本文結論仍然不變。

Both the correspondence relationship with banks and information disclosure policy for firms can reduce information asymmetry and costs of capital. This paper attempts to understand the attitude firms have for these two policies. This paper presents two contending hypotheses: substitutive disclosure hypothesis and complementary disclosure hypothesis. The former considers a negative relationship between lending relationship and information disclosure level; the latter proposes a positive relationship. The sample is the stock-listing and OTC firms from 2005 to 2010. The finding is that the disclosure policy of firms is consistent with the substitutive disclosure hypothesis, indicating that when firms have close banking lending relationships, to reduce disclosure costs, a passive disclosure policy is considered because of banks' signaling effects and not worrying about future financing. However, this phenomenon also reveals that firms possibly have up-limit level of disclosures and thus information transparency does not rise further. The substitutive disclosure result is more significant for firms under family control or with a larger deviation between voting and cash flow rights that likely face more serious agency problems. Considering voluntary disclosure, the effect of global financial crisis of 2008, and other multiple robustness checks, the conclusion is unchanged.