臺灣企業之股息分派案須經年度股東會表決通過，然後依慣例地授權董事會決定除息日與發放日。過去數年，三陽工業經歷激烈的經營權競爭。在2013 年，三陽董事會授權董事長全權決定股息發放日，引發「股利未發先扣稅」事件。在2014 年，三陽董事會也授權董事長做股東會地點的最後決定，引發「股東會場地違規」事件。市場派股東為以上事件反撲，導致證交所營業細則增訂「三陽條款」，三陽股票也一度被打入全額交割股。本研究回顧臺灣上市公司之相關事件(2004年至2013年)，以及透過審視相關法令，據以分析證交所對上述事件處置之合宜性。本研究主張，三陽被打入全額交割股事件，不符合證交所執法之一致性與比例原則，本文提出修改法令與處理程序之替代方案。此外，本文認為三陽事件得以順利落幕，歸功於股東會電子投票制度的效率與公信。

According to the Company Law, a corporate dividend policy must be formally recognized by the general assembly of stockholders, while the stockholders delegate the decisions on the ex-dividend date and the payment date to the board of directors. Sanyang Corporation experienced severe corporate control battles between the Management faction and the Market faction of shareholders. In 2013, when the board of directors decided on the ex-dividend date, it also delegated the decision on the payment date to the chairperson of the board. This eventually caused shareholders to complain that they had to pay income tax on dividends that had not been received. Again, in an attempt to fight against the dissenting Market faction in 2014, the board of directors delegated the decision on the location for holding the general assembly to the chairperson. The former incident resulted in the TWSE amending the Operating Rules, appending the so-called Sanyang rule. The latter incident resulted in a controversial venue for the general assembly, and consequently the TWSE put the Sanyang stocks under an altered trading method. This paper discusses the legitimacy of the TWSE's policy by reviewing relevant events of TWSE-listed firms from 2004 to 2013, and by examining the related regulations. We claim that the policy of the TWSE does not align with consistent and proportional principles. We propose an alternative policy for the TWSE and amendments on the Operating Rules. In addition, this study claims that the newly established electronic voting system is critical to the final settlement of the power struggle. This system yields efficient and convincing resolution for shareholder meeting votes.