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題名:言論自由還是詐欺?--國際信評機構不準確評等之研究
書刊名:東吳法律學報
作者:陳盈如 引用關係
作者(外文):Chen, Ying-ru
出版日期:2016
卷期:28:1
頁次:頁87-149
主題關鍵詞:信用評等機構證券詐欺言論自由第一修正案利益衝突惡意對市場詐欺理論損失因果關係風險實現理論過失提供不實資訊Credit rating agenciesSecurities fraudFreedom of speechFirst amendmentConflicts of interestScienterFraud-on-the-market theoryLoss causationMaterialization of riskNegligent misrepresentation
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每在大型金融危機過後,信用評等機構都受到各界嚴厲撻伐,指責其從事嚴重之利益衝突行為,導致信用評等幾乎無法作為投資風險控管之參考,反而是為發行人服務,膨脹評等結果或降低評等標準,以取悅對其付費之客戶。許多投資者紛紛對於信評機構提起各種損害賠償訴訟。然而,信評機構堅持其所為之評等報告乃為一「意見」(statement of opinion),主張其信用評等屬於美國憲法第一修正案所保護之「言論自由」範圍,原告必須要證明被告具有「真正惡意」(actual malice),始得請求損害賠償,而證明真正惡意之門檻相當之高,過去幾乎沒有信評機構敗訴之案例。然而,美國近年來實務或學說討論上,已漸轉趨認為,信用評等並非只是一個單純之預測意見;相反地,藉由其資訊與智識上之優勢,所作成之專業評估報告,信評機構應對信賴其資訊而做成投資決定之人負法律上責任。此一責任有可能是過失責任,亦有可能是證券詐欺之故意或未必故意責任。本文主張,應使信評機構負證券詐欺之故意或未必故意責任。金融市場瞬息萬變,金融商品之結構複雜度極高,因此若使信評機構負一般過失責任,則可能會造成信評產業之寒蟬效應,對於信評業之發展,亦不妥適。故以證券詐欺之故意或未必故意責任為宜。再者,我國關於證券詐欺之立法,乃參考美國反詐欺條款Rule 10b-5 精神而來,雖然我國目前幾乎不見對於信評機構提起損害賠償訴訟,但美國這類型訴訟越來越多,實值得我們注意。本文以目前美國法院之判決以及相關學說,對於信評機構之責任做一探討,以期將來作為我國訴訟與法院判決之借鏡參考。
Credit rating agencies are criticized extensively following every financial crisis in the past decades. Those criticisms often lead them to engage in activities that actually are conflicts of interest, and their ratings then become minimally functional for their investment risk control activities. However, these activities contradict credit rating agencies' desire to give confidence to the issuer, in which the agencies inflate credit rating results or possibly even downgrade their own rating standards, in order to please the issuers who pay them fees for providing credit ratings. Some investors have brought a diverse set of suits against the credit rating agencies, including fraud and negligence misrepresentation. However, credit rating agencies have insisted that the ratings are just a statement of opinions. Therefore, if anything were to go wrong, they have no scienter on providing inaccurate ratings, or they have no duty to the reader, and the investors actually have no reasonable reliance on their ratings. Moreover, they have asserted that their ratings are protected by the First Amendment for freedom of speech, and the plaintiffs must prove they have actual malice, which is extremely hard to prove, in order to bring a suit against the credit rating agencies. However, more recent discussions and court decisions have changed their opinions about the liability of credit rating agencies. They believe credit rating agencies are more like accountants or securities analysts who employ their expertise and are in an independent position to evaluate the possibility of issuer default. The ratings are not just predictions or opinions but professional evaluations which are performed by financial experts who have non-accessible information. As a result, they should be liable for the ratings they provide. In addition, the liability can be a negligent misrepresentation liability or the intentional or reckless securities fraud liability according to many discussions. In this article, we believe the intentional or reckless securities fraud liability is more proper, because the financial market changes all the time, and the financial products are quite complicated. If we ask the credit rating agencies to take negligent misrepresentation liability, it will have the chilling effect on the credit rating industry. The legislation on securities fraud in Taiwan is also considered on par with the Rule 10b-5. Therefore, we believe this article can be the reference and basis for our future litigations and court decisions for credit rating agencies' responsibilities.
期刊論文
1.張心悌(2007)。證券詐欺之因果關係與損害賠償--板橋地方法院九六年金字第二號民事判決評釋。臺灣本土法學雜誌,101,251-258。  延伸查詢new window
2.汪信君(20131200)。信用評等機構監理規範之發展與困境:問責基礎與利益衝突。國立臺灣大學法學論叢,42(4),1333-1385。new window  延伸查詢new window
3.邵慶平(20130300)。證券交易法第20條第1項之民事責任主體不及於次要行為人?:以企業財報不實類型案例為中心。國立臺灣大學法學論叢,42(1),171-214。new window  延伸查詢new window
4.Couture, Wendy Gerwick(2014)。The Collision between the First Amendment and Securities Fraud。Ala. L. Rev.,65,903-974。  new window
5.Deats, Caleb(2010)。Talk That Isn't Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect Credit Rating Agencies' Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?。COLUM. L. REV.,110,1818-1864。  new window
6.Husisian, Gregory(1990)。What Standard of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating. Agency Liability。CORNELL L. REV.,75,411-461。  new window
7.Jones, Rachel(2010)。The Need for a Negligence Standard of Care for Credit Rating Agencies。WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.,1,201-231。  new window
8.Lee, Ai-Lin(2015)。Credit Rating Agencies--Do They Adequately Fulfil Their Gatekeeper Role in Debt Capital Markets?。J.I.B.L.R.,30(2),82-103。  new window
9.Ellis, Nan S.(2012)。Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis。STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.,17,175-222。  new window
10.Nagy, Theresa(2009)。Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation。MINN. L. REV.,94,140-167。  new window
11.Schmitt, Christopher(2011)。Holding the Enablers Responsible: Applying Sec Rule 10b-5 Liability to the Credit Rating Institutions。U. PA. J. BUS. L.,13,1035-1058。  new window
12.Wessendorf, Erin M.(2008)。Regulating the Credit Rating Agencies。ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J.,3,155-175。  new window
13.莊永丞(20111200)。對信用評等機構應有規範之比較研究。國立臺灣大學法學論叢,40(4),2249-2321。new window  延伸查詢new window
14.Fisch, Jill E.(2009)。Cause for Concern : Causation and Federal Securities Fraud。IOWA L. REV.,94,811-872。  new window
研究報告
1.Lehmann, Matthias(2014)。Civil Liability of Rating Agencies: An Insipid Sprout from Brussels。  new window
2.US Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs(20021008)。Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs。  new window
學位論文
1.Crumley, Diana G.(2016)。Credit Rating Agencies and Conflicts of Interest(碩士論文)。The University of Texas at Austin。  new window
圖書
1.賴英照(2014)。股市遊戲規則:最新證券交易法解析。賴英照。  延伸查詢new window
2.Naciri, Ahmed(2015)。Credit Rating Governance: Global Credit Gatekeepers。  new window
3.劉連煜(2014)。新證券交易法實例研習。元照。new window  延伸查詢new window
其他
1.財團法入台灣經濟研究院。金融防火牆之研究,http://goo.gl/caLQ78, 2016/04/25。  延伸查詢new window
2.Council on Foreign Relations。The Credit Rating Controversy,http://www.cfr.org/financialcrises/credit-rating-controversy/p22328, 2016/04/25。  new window
3.European Securities and Markets Authority。Credit Rating Agencies' 2014 Market Share Calculations for the Purposes of Article 8d of the CRA Regulation (Table 1),http ://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2014-1583_credit_rating_agencies_market_share_calculation_2014.pdf, 2016/04/25。  new window
4.Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission(2011)。Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn__media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf, 2016/04/25。  new window
5.Fons, Jerome S.。Tracing the Origins of “Investment Grade”,http://www.fonsrisksolutions.com/Documents/Investment%20Grade.pdf。  new window
6.Moody's Investor Service(201504)。Code of Professional Conduct,https://www.moodys.com/uploadpage/Mco%20Documents/Documents_professional_conduct.pdf, 2016/04/25。  new window
7.Nasiripour, Shahien(20091130)。Credit Rating Agency Analysts Covering AIG, Lehman Brothers Never Disciplined,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/30/credit-rating-agency-anal_n_305587.html。  new window
 
 
 
 
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