本文以國會決策相關理論為基礎，檢證委員會的自主性以及在立法院決策過程中的角色，主要由三個想向切入：一、就委員會內部組成與權力結構內涵、二、委員會成員的政策偏好結構、以及三、委員會在立法決策的外部效能等三個局面。透過與部分第三屆立委的訪談，以及立法院投票紀錄與其他相關法案審議資料的蒐集，結果顯示：首先，委員會的結構為高度分化、個人化與零碎化的一個組合，透過檢驗委員會法案團結度指標可以得知，委員會在其所轄且已經審結的法案上，立場未如黨團般一致團結，委員會成員在政策偏上為一相對分歧的組合。再者，在院會決議階段，政黨協商取代了委員會與院會審議，委員會的決策自主性更加削弱，由檢驗委員會與院會偏好差異相關指標，可以得知委員會受到院會生態的影響，就其所轄議題與院會多數並無顯著偏好差異。雖然委員會與院會多數兩者在院會法案表決時立場相近，但是由第三屆法案審議結果來看，委員會的法案明顯的遭受院會大幅修正。整體而言，委員會在立院決策體系中欠缺自主性與獨立性，委員會只是暫時性的議題聯盟動員網路，以及利益交換的場所。

　　　　　This study examines the role and function of committees in the process of legislative policy-making from three aspects: (1)the internal power structure of the committees, (2)the preference structure of the committee, and (3)whether or not the policy instrument made by committees will succeed in chamber. This study examined these three aspects by interviewing with some third-term legislators and analyzing the roll call vote and legislative data of the third-term Legislative Yuan. The data shows that first, the committee's inner structure is a highly decentralized, individualized, and fragmentized combination, the index of committee cohesion shows that the committees within their jurisdiction are not as cohesive as the parties. Furthermore, the disagreement index and the divergence index also show that the disagreement between the committee and the chamber is not significant, that is, committees' policy preferences are affected by the will of the chamber majority. Even though the policy position of committee is close to that of the Yuan, as a whole, the committees' legislations are heavily revised at the chamber stage. It suggests that the committee lacks autonomy and independence from the chamber. The committee system is a temporary issue alliance, the basis of policy mobilization, and the forum of interest exchange.