一般預期，雙邊自由貿易協定（Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, BFTAs）會 危害到多邊經貿組織的貿易自由化議程及其內部的組織運作（簡稱危害說）。為 此，本文運用大量原始檔案的內容分析結果，來試圖檢證亞太地區的BFTAs 洽 簽活動是否危害亞太經濟合作會議（Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC） 的組織運作。首先，從言語重視程度來看，本文發現APEC 各國領袖及資深官 員可能會因BFTAs 洽簽活動而較不關注APEC 之貿易暨投資自由化核心議程， 卻反而較強調APEC 經濟和技術合作及能力建構之核心議程。然而，上述兩大 核心議程在APEC 領袖和資深官員的言辭重視中並非互斥關係。另外，從APEC 組織運作的實際行動，即APEC 工作計畫的執行來看，本文發現若特定年度任 兩個配對國曾向世界貿易組織（World Trade Organization, WTO）登記BFTAs， 則其執行的APEC 計畫數目較少，由此證實了「危害說」。然而，當在特定年度 此組配對國向WTO 登記BFTAs 的累計數目越多時，則其所執行APEC 計畫數 目反而越多。此項發現意謂著會員體之BFTAs 洽簽活動對APEC 組織運作並不 全然是負面的影響。尤其當各會員體之BFTAs 累計數量愈多時，反而更願意執 行APEC 計畫來強化其BFTAs 之政策方向。本文之發現因而修正了過去學界對 此議題的理論假設。

It is usually assumed that the signing of bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs) will undermine the trade liberalization agenda and internal operations of multilateral organizations (call it the “undermining hypothesis”). Using the results of content analyses on massive volumes of archive data from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), this paper aims to verify the above “undermining hypothesis.” Contrary to the common expectations, I find that APEC leaders and senior officials, perhaps due to various BFTAs activities, are less likely to emphasize the core agenda of APEC on trade and investment liberalization and facilitation (TILF), but more likely to stress another core agenda on economic and technology cooperation (ECOTECH). However, there is no tradeoff effect between their emphasis on TILF and that on the ECOTECH agenda. Moreover, in the implementation record of APEC projects, I find that in any given year, if a pair of countries (APEC economies themselves, or non-members) register BFTAs in the World Trade Organization (WTO), then the number of their APEC projects implemented is reduced. However, in any given year, the greater the accumulated number of BFTAs for a pair of countries, the greater the number of APEC projects they implement. This latter finding is not entirely compatible with the “undermining hypothesis,” as it seems to suggest that the greater the accumulated number of BFTAs is signed, the greater the need to implement APEC projects. Indeed, many APEC projects are considered by member economies as preconditions, facilitators, or side payments for them to push forward the trade liberalization agenda. Therefore, it is likely that when the accumulated number of BFTAs increases, APEC members may feel it necessary to do more APEC projects, and hence the number of APEC project implemented increases. This finding revises the conventional wisdom derived from the “undermining hypothesis.”