本論文主要依據西田幾多郎〈叡智的世界〉（1928）一文，來探討中期西田「絕對無」或「絕對無的場所」的意義。中期西田哲學主要在建立一個「自覺的體系」，將一切存在理解為全般者的內存在物，並且最終內存於絕對無的場所當中。或者反過來說，任何的存在都是絕對無的自我限定。在〈叡智的世界〉一文當中，西田首先區別開三種全般者（判斷的全般者、自覺的全般者與叡智的全般者）以及作為「全般者的全般者」的絕對無的場所。其中「叡智的世界」表示理型所內存於其中的場所。透過在述詞或自覺方向上的超越，西田最終達到絕對無的場所。在本論文當中，筆者重構西田從「有」沿著內在超越而通向「無」的道路，並且試著闡釋西田「絕對無」的意義。行文上，在簡單地說明本文的方法與論題之後（第一節），我們接著重構西田由「意識的世界」通往「叡智的世界」（第二節）以及由「叡智的世界」通向「絕對無的場所」的思路（第三節），這是一條典型的「內在超越」的道路，從「有」開始而終於「絕對無」。西田稱絕對無的場所是一種宗教的無的體驗。在本論文的最後（第四節），我們將這種「無的體驗」，對比於海德格於〈形上學是什麼？〉（1929）當中對無的體驗的說明。筆者認為，對西田與海德格而言，透過「無的體驗」所要表示是包含在我們日常經驗中的「全體體驗」，人與世界的關係先在於人與對象的關係。

In this paper I attempt to shed light on the basic meaning of Kitaro Nishida's ”Absolute Nothingness” in middle Nishida. During this period of his philosophy Nishida concentrated on the establishment of a ”system of self-consciousness” that reached from the universality of judgment to the place of absolute nothingness. Specifically, I focus on his essay ”The Intelligible World” written in 1928. For Nishida, ”being” meant to be determined by or located in a universal. This state of affairs can also be expressed as the ”self-determination of the universal,” which is a key concept in his system of self-consciousness. By demonstrating a path of immanent transcendence which goes deep into the direction of predicate or self-consciousness, Nishida finally reaches the basho of absolute nothingness. In this essay I try to reconstruct Nishida's path, leading from being to nothingness, and to expound some possible meaning of absolute nothingness in his middle period. The study is divided into four sections. After a brief introduction of the theme and methods of the article (section one), I try to reconstruct Nishida's transcendental path from the ”world of consciousness” to ”the intelligible world” (section two) and then the transition from ”the intelligible world” to the ”basho of absolute nothingness” (section three). The intelligible world is the world in which ideal beings (such as truth, beauty and good) are located. Finally in the last section (section four) I make a summary of the meaning of absolute nothingness. Through comparison with Heidegger's elucidation of the experience of nothingness in anxiety, as outlined in his article ”What is Metaphysics?” in 1929, I also attempt to expound some possible horizons that are opened by Nishida in his discussion of the experience of nothingness. It is my view that the experience of nothingness is not an extraordinary experience, but a hidden moment inherent in our daily experience.