Although local governments play an important role in the political process, some township-level governments in Taiwan experienced seriously financial shortages in the past decade. In Taiwan's unitary system, the central government maintains its control over politics at the lower levels by controlling their finances. Taxes are centrally assessed and collected, and afterward reallocated to the local governments. This practice evidently affords the central government considerable leverages in its efforts to dominate local politics This study aims to analyze the 1990-2001 budgetary data of Chu-chi Township Chia-yi County in order to comprehend the township-level financial problems under Taiwan's highly centralized unitary system. We empirically examine Chu-chi Township's financial capacity in terms of "the expenditures for personnel," "substantial revenues," "supplemental revenues," and “the budgetary debits." In addition, we raise some feasible reform proposals to solve financial problems: first, the central government should make up some certain rules for local expenditures according to the administrative scales; second, the procedures for reallocating block grants from the central authorities to the local governments should be much more open; third, the executives should be charged financial accountabilities if the needs of the local units are suited; fourth, the information of local finances should be routinely released to the general public; fifth, the rules for hiring temporary staffs should be regulated in a restrictive way; sixth, the central government should adjust the land values annually and make them close to the market prices; seventh, the central government should consult the local units so as to increase local expenditures or decrease taxes; and, last but not the least, the way for the township executives might be changed from the general election to the appointment by magistrates/mayors in order to release the financial overburdening.