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題名：一個沒有固定方法的方法論：論「典範知識」的「相對主義式誤解」
書刊名：政治與社會哲學評論
作者：苑舉正 引用關係
作者(外文)：Yuann, Jeu-jenq
出版日期：2007
卷期：21
頁次：頁47-88
主題關鍵詞：孔恩；科學革命的結構；相對主義；理論轉換；價值；T. Kuhn；The structure of scientific revolutions；Relativism；Theory change；Value
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(4) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:11
  • 點閱點閱:44
本文剖析各種應用孔恩之《科學革命的結構》理念所引發的問題，然後針對這些問題，提出嘗試的解答。本文認為，該應用所出現的問題，主要在於將「科學社群」這個概念，視作「科學定義」。如此一來，往往容易使得孔恩在《結構》中所昭示的哲學思想，成為以「科學社群」為主的「相對主義」。孔恩曾經不斷地嘗試，說明他不贊同「相對主義」的立場，但成效不彰。我們在本文中，假設孔恩未能明示地釐清其「立場」的原因，正好就是他不斷致力於強調的部分，也就是在科學實作中不能形式化的部分。我們認為，這種重視「實作成分」的哲學，不但是孔恩哲學「創新」的部分，也是他長期招致誤解的主因，尤其是對那些期待客觀與苦遍解釋的人而言。因此，在這些期待中，縱使孔恩在《結構》後，提出新的觀點(即「價值」)，但是這個觀點依然包含許多不受「客觀主義」與「普遍主義」接納的概念，例如「團體決策」、「主觀因素」以及「客觀價值」等。然而，在孔恩哲學的「創新」之中，這些概念都是用來說明科學發展的核心，緊緊扣著科學實際的活動。
This paper intends to ana1yze problems derived from applying T. Kuhn's ideas developed since the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Then, we will try to offer an explanation explicating how these problems could have taken place. With regard to the concerned problems, the paper deems evident that they mainly originate from many people's identification between the idea of scientific community with the definition of science. This identification consequently causes an accusation of relativism established erroneously on the basis of scientific community. Though Kuhn ceaselessly denied the accusation, but his efforts fell in vain. In this paper, we intend to put forward a hypothesis, depicting that the reasons why Kuhn failed to clarify his positions were precisely the parts he constantly stressed throughout his life, namely, the practica1 parts of science. We intend therefore to reiterate that they are innovative as well as reasons of the misunderstandings of Kuhn's philosophy. The reasons are especially clear for those who anticipate "objective" and "universal" solutions and thus fail to appreciate Kuhn's innovative expositions. Kuhn attempted to propose other ideas (such as that of va1ues) in order to repudiate the allegations, explaining the procedure of theory change as well as theory choice. However, as these ideas still contain subjective conceptions (such as "group va1ue", "subjective elements", "objective va1ues", etc), they remain to be unacceptable for objectivists.
期刊論文
1.Kasza, Gregory J.(2001)。Perestroika: For an Ecumenical Science of Politics。PS: Political Science & Politics，34(3)，597-599。  new window
2.Fuller, S.(1992)。Being There with Thomas Kuhn: A Parable for Postmodern Times。History and Theory，31，241-275。  new window
3.Kuhn, T.(1972)。Notes on Lakatos。Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science，8，137-146。  new window
4.Machamer, P.、Osbeck, L.(2003)。Scientific Normativity as Non-epistemic: A Hidden Kuhnian Legacy。Social Epistemology，17，3-11。  new window
5.Hollinger, D. A.(1973)。T. S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History。The American Historical Review，78，370-393。  new window
6.Sent, Ester-Mirjam(2001)。Thomas Kuhn: The Wrong Person at the Right Place and the Right Time。The Review of Politics，63(Spring)，390-392。  new window
7.Kuklick, B.(1970)。History as a way of Learning。American Quarterly，22，621。  new window
8.Hollinger, David A.(1973)。T. S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History。American Historical Review，78，374。  new window
9.Kuhn, Thomas S.。Notes on Lakatos。Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science，8，137。  new window
10.Fuller, S.。Being There with Thomas Kuhn: A Parable for Postmodern Times。History and Theory，313，241-275。  new window
圖書
1.Barnes, Barry、Bloor, David、Henry, John(1996)。Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis。Chicago, IL：The University of Chicago Press。  new window
2.Kuhn, Thomas S.(2000)。The road since structure。Chicago：University of Chicago Press。  new window
3.Barnes, Barry(1982)。T. S. Kuhn and social science。London：MacMillan Press。  new window
4.Feyerabend, Paul K.(1993)。Against Method。London。  new window
5.Hoyningen-Heune, P.(1993)。Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions。Chicago：The University of Chicago Press。  new window
6.(1980)。Paradigms and Revolutions。Notre Dame, IN：University of Notre Dame University。  new window
7.Feyerabend, Paul(1993)。Against Method。Verso。  new window
8.Nickles, Thomas(2003)。Thomas Kuhn。Thomas Kuhn。Cambridge, UK/ New York, NY：Cambridge University Press。  new window
9.Sokal, A.、Bricmont, J.(1998)。Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science。New York, NY：Picador。  new window
10.Kuhn, T. S.(1977)。The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition。Chicago：University of Chicago Press。  new window
11.Scheffler, I.(1967)。Science and Subjectivity。Indianapolis, IN：Bobbs-merrill。  new window
12.Feyerabend, Paul(1978)。Science in a free society。Lowe & Brydone Ltd.。  new window
13.Shapere, Dudley(1984)。Reason and the Search for Knowledge。D. Reidel Publishing Company。  new window
14.Lakatos, Imre、Worral, John、Currie, Gregory(1978)。The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes。Cambridge：Cambridge University Press。  new window
15.Kuhn, Thomas S.、程樹德、傅大為、王道還、錢永祥(1994)。科學革命的結構。臺北市：遠流出版公司。  延伸查詢new window
16.朱元鴻、傅大為(2001)。孔恩：評論集。巨流圖書出版公司。  延伸查詢new window
17.Kuhn, Thomas Samuel(1970)。The Structure of Scientific Revolutions。University of Chicago Press。  new window
18.Feyerabend, P.(1981)。Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Problems of Empiricism。Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Problems of Empiricism。Cambridge, UK/ New York, NY。  new window
19.Popper, K.(1985)。Realism and the Aim of Science。Realism and the Aim of Science。London, UK。  new window
20.Fuller, S.(1993)。Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents。Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents。New York, NY。  new window
21.顏良恭(1995)。公共行政中的典範問題。臺北市：五南。new window  延伸查詢new window
22.Lauden, L. B.(1996)。Positivism and Relativism。Positivism and Relativism。Oxford, UK。  new window
23.Fuller, S.(2000)。Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times。Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times。Chicago, IL。  new window
24.Farrell, R.(2003)。Feyerabend and Scientific Values。Feyerabend and Scientific Values。Dordrecht, Netherlands。  new window
25.Polanyi, M.(1963)。Comments by M. Polanyi on 'The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research'。Scientific Change。London, UK。  new window
26.Kuhn, T.(1963)。Discussion。Scientific Change。London, UK。  new window
27.Kuhn, T.(1963)。The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research。Scientific Change。London, UK。  new window
28.Lakatos, I.(1970)。Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes。Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge。Cambridge, UK/ New York, NY。  new window
29.Feigl, H.(1974)。Empiricism at Bay? Revisions and a New Defense。Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences。Dordrecht, Netherlands。  new window
30.Friedman, M.(2003)。Kuhn and Logical Empiricism。Thomas Kuhn。Cambridge, UK/ New York, NY。  new window
31.(2003)。Normal Science: From Logic to Cased-based and Modelbased Reasoning。Thomas Kuhn。Cambridge, UK/ New York, NY。  new window
32.Barnes, B.(2003)。T. S. Kuhn and the Problem of Social Order in Science。Thomas Kuhn。Cambridge, UK/ New York, NY。  new window
33.Lakatos, Imre(1970)。Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes。Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge。Cambridge。  new window
34.Fuller, S.(2000)。Thomas Kuhn。Thomas Kuhn。Chicago。  new window
35.Fuller, S.(1993)。Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents。Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents。New York。  new window
36.Gutting, Gary(1980)。Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science。Paradigms and Revolutions: Appraisals and Applications of Thomas Kuhn's Philosophy of Science。Norre Dame。  new window
37.Feyerabend, Paul Karl(1981)。Consolations for the Specialist。Philosophical Papers (Vol. II)。Cambridge。  new window
38.Popper, Karl R.(1970)。Normal Scienve and Its Danger。Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge。Cambridge。  new window
39.Kuhn, Thomas S.(1963)。The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research。Scientific Change。London。  new window
40.Farrell, Ruby(2003)。Feyerabend and Scientific Values。Feyerabend and Scientific Values。Dordrecht。  new window
41.Kuhn, Thomas S.(1970)。Reflections on My Critics。Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge。Cambridge。  new window
42.Kuhn, Thomas S.(1970)。The Essential Tension。The Essential Tension。Chicago。  new window
圖書論文
1.傅大為(2001)。H2O的一個不可共量史：重論「不可共量性」及其與意義理論之爭。孔恩：評論集。臺北：巨流。  延伸查詢new window
2.陳瑞麟(2001)。《科學革命的結構》之後。孔恩：評論集。臺北：巨流。  延伸查詢new window
3.Kuhn, T.(1970)。Reflections on My Critics。Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge。Cambridge：Cambridge University Press。  new window
4.林正弘(2001)。論孔恩的典範概念。孔恩：評論集。臺北：巨流。  延伸查詢new window
5.Feyerabend, Paul Karl(1978)。Science in a Free Society。Science in a Free Society。London。  new window
6.Popper, K.(1970)。Normal Science and Its Danger。Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge。Cambridge：Cambridge University Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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