對於傳播學界，1991年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主科思（Ronald Coase）的論旨，而特別是他的傳媒觀點，有其意義。根據主流經濟學的固有看法，傳媒「內容」具有公共財與外部性兩種性質，造成市場失靈，因此，政府宜研擬合宜的傳播政策，介入傳媒市場。但科斯得獎的重要理由，正在他破除定論，鬆動外部性應由國家干預的正當性，科斯另文也挑戰公共財必定由政府提供的史實。此外，從1950至1979年，科斯分別針對傳播課題，撰寫了八篇論文，更能清晰展現他的理念，可說是激烈地反對政府介入。是以，科斯先說，公營壟斷廣播出現於英國，多屬時代精神所致，以此暗示BBC 模式出於偶然；次則質疑美國聯邦傳播委員會，指其電波公共信託模式徒然製造尋租機會；繼之，他論稱言論與一般產品並無不同，政府介入規範二者的水平，應該相當；然後，科斯再往前推進，宣稱廣告無非是言論的一種特殊類型，付費打歌是出資者無意讓閱聽人知道出資者身分的廣告，而政府對於這些廣告與打歌現象的管制效果，經常適得其反。本文引述這些論說且有所對話與批評，最後則指出，建構有效且民主的政府，仍然是面對傳媒內容特殊性時，難以迴避的選擇。

As a prestigious Nobel Prize winner in economics, Ronald Coase’s media discourses deserve specific attention. With its ‘public goods’ and ‘externalities’ natures, media ‘content’ is one key case where market fails to bring about satisfactory performance and therefore calls into the state to intervene. Coase has however made his name known exactly for his argument against the inevitable outcome of government actions whenever market ‘fails’. Five of his media essays published between 1950 and 1979 are critically reviewed. Coase considers the creation of BBC has more to do with accidents than any careful state reasoning, FCC adopts a public-trustee model to allocate radio spectrum only to provide its bureaucrats opportunities of rent-seeking, and the state has no more legitimacy in regulating speech, advertising and payola than in regulating goods in general, what’s more, in cases when the state does intervene, the ensuing results are often deteriorating, rather than improving. This paper reflects upon Coase’s radical rhetoric and concludes that, contrary to his ideal, it’s wiser and more practical to have a more effective and democratic state macro regulating the media market, not to leave market on its own.