有限公司不執行業務之股東，均得行使監察權，公司法第109條定有明文。但是，如果不執行業務之股東兼任公司經理人，不免具有執行業務之職權，則其監察權是否應受限制，公司法並無任何規定，實值得探討研究。而股東行使監察權，準用第48條之規定，得隨時向執行業務之董事質詢公司營業情形，查閱財產文件、帳簿、表冊，但當其出現利益衝突，明顯可能有致公司損害時，是否應仿德國有限公司立法例，公司有拒絕提供資訊之權？本文特以臺灣高等法院98年度上字第1198號民事判決為例，嘗試以請求權基礎來評析綜論原被告、法院、學者甚或外國立法例之見解，既期掌握現行法解釋適用之可能及其法制不足處，亦可藉法理論說而寄望法官造法，填補漏洞以啟法律續造之功，或者期待立法者適時增修法律以補法制之缺失。

Pursuant to Article 109 of the Taiwan Company Act, the shareholders of a limited company, who do not conduct business, may, from time to time, exercise power of audit. Nevertheless, when a shareholder holds concurrently a managerial officer of the company, should his audit be forbidden? The provision is still not incorporated into the Taiwan Company Act. How could this question of incompatibility be solved? In the performance of shareholder, the provisions in Article 48 shall mutatis mutandis apply to such power of audit. That means shareholders may, at any time, require directors to furnish information on the business condition of the company and examine its assets, documents, books and statement. When there is a conflict of interest for shareholders, does the company have the power to turn down the right like German model. All these questions are fundamental and important. This article therefore tries to review doctrine and court practice. Basing on Anspruchsgrundlage to comment Taiwan High Court 98-Shang-1198 Judgement from de lege lata and de lege ferenda.