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題名：薪酬制度是否真能約束高階經理人剝削債權人之利益？
書刊名：企業管理學報
作者：張千雲 引用關係／鄭瑞昌 引用關係／陳振宇 引用關係
作者(外文)：Chang, Chien-yun／Cheng, Jui-chang／Chen, Chen-yu
出版日期：2016
卷期：110
頁次：頁1-25
主題關鍵詞：薪酬操弄；經理人權力；Pay rigging；CEOs power
原始連結：連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:15
  • 點閱點閱:26
本研究發現當高階經理人因女專業性而取得較高程度之決策權時，其決策易陷入獨裁性決策，公司較不易提供集體決策之多角化優勢，經理人將較易操弄薪酬制度。另外，經理人權力亦會增加錯誤決策的可能性，傷害了企業績效的穩定性，導致其企業信用評等愈低，舉債期限愈長，而債權人將會對公司要求更高程度之風險溢酬。最後，本研究亦發現企業舉債期限之決定，係以避免遭受破產清算危機為主。
This paper finds that, when CEOs have greater power because of their expert ability, their decision would be more dominative and fail to offer the diversification benefit of group decision. Therefore, CEOs can manipulate the payment system easily. Furthermore, CEOs power would increase the possibility of suffering wrong decisions and hurt the persistence of firm performance. It could deteriorate a firm's credit rating and bond holders would require more premiums for taking higher risk. The decision of bond duration is associated with the tendency to reducing bankruptcy crisis.
期刊論文
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研究報告
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圖書
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圖書論文
1.Murphy, Kevin J.(1999)。Executive Compensation。Handbook of Labor Economics。North Holland。  new window
 
 
 
 
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