本研究主要在探討家族公司對負債融資成本的衝擊，為了家族公司是否有相對較低的負債融資成本，本研究將其影響區分為家族所有權、控制權和管理權等三種效果，實證結果發現家族公司持股比率與負債融資成本呈現倒U關係，透過擴增控制權機制所產生的代理問題會提高負債融資成本、家族成員擔任總經理會顯著降低負債融資成本，從代理問題的觀點發現股東和管理者的代理衝突對負債融資成本的影響大於家族股東與非家族股東的代理衝突。

We investigate the impact of family firms on the cost of debt. We posit that, in order to understand whether family firms are related to a lower cost a debt financing, we must distinguish among three effects: ownership, control, and management. We find that the relationship of family firm’s ownership and debt financing costs is inverted-U and family management is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our findings suggest that classic ownership-manager is more costly than the conflict between family and non-family shareholders on the cost of debt financing.