本文針對組織內單票制且多人可當選之選舉方式提出一數學分析模型， 以求解在 多黨競爭且不充分情報下之最適配票策略，並經由此策略使我方黨派之當選席次極大化。另 外，在前述之當選席次極大化之既定目標下，建構另一數學規劃模型，以使總配票成本或總 配票困難度極小化，即配票之經濟設計。此二元循序最佳化為本研究之主要架構。此外，本 研究亦於中文提出五個定理並證明其成立。最後，提出六個具體結論，作為後續研究之參考 。

　　　　　In the multiple parties' competition for election campaign within organization and the informationdoes not sufficient among parties, this paper proposes a mathematical model to optimize the votes allocation strategy on a single voting and multiple elects system. By applying the optimal strategy, it can maximize the number of elects for my own party. In addition, given the optimal votes allocation strategy, this paper constructs another mathematical programming model to minimize the total cost of votes allocation. The optimization for the two sequential goals is the main structure of this paper. Furthermore, this paper also proposes five theorems and proved their existence. Finally, six conclusions are drawn for future appllications.