本研究透過同一地點但不同的兩次選舉（1993年縣市長和2000年總統大選），來討論買票對於國民黨選舉機器的重要性。筆者將論證，買票對於國民黨的選舉機器而言，有如潤滑油對於引擎般重要。沒有買票，國民黨的選舉動員不僅無法透過買票的金錢效果達到動員選民的目的，更重要的是，國民黨地方的選舉機器根本無法有效運作。 筆者將重新檢討1993年國民黨選舉機器動員的過程。雖然，該次選舉被許多當事人認為是國民黨最成功的一次選舉動員，但筆者發現該次選舉中也出現了許多選舉動員問題。這些問題包括樁腳是相對稀少的資源、樁腳是否適任、派系主義、侍從網絡的重疊性、派系領導者和樁腳會吃錢、不易找到適當選舉動員操盤者、買票效果的有限性。在該次選舉中，高達45％的選民拿了買票錢，卻沒有投票給國民黨候選人。在2000年的總統大選中，「表面」上（或書面）國民黨動員了許多樁腳，但因為在不買票的情況下，「名單」上的樁腳並不一定認為自己是樁腳，即使這些人認為自己是樁腳，也不知該向哪些特定選民拉票。同時，在沒買票的情況下，國民黨的輔選幹部也無法瞭解和監督樁腳是否確實動員。簡而言之，沒有買票，國民黨的樁腳根本不知道如何為其候選人動員。

With two elections in the same locale, this paper studies the importance of vote-buying to the Kuomintang political machine. The author argues that the role of vote-buying in the KMT political machine is similar to that of lubricating oil in an engine. Without vote-buying, the KMT political machine can not function well. In the successful election of 1993, there were seven serious obstacles faced by the KMT on the way to building a successful political machine: (1) the scarcity of brokers, (2) the potential incompetence of brokers, (3) factionalism within clientelistic networks, (4) overlaps in factional and broker-level networks, (5) embezzlement, (6) unpredictable managers of mobilizations, and (7) limited funds for vote-buying. Forty-five percent of the voters who accepted the money for vote-buying did not vote for the KMT candidate. However, the obstacles' importance was less than vote-buying. In the 2000 presidential election, the KMT documents showed that the party used many brokers to mobilize voters. However, without votes-buying, these people in the KMT broker list would not have regarded themselves as brokers, and did not know how to mobilize voters.