就產前遺傳診斷失誤致產下缺陷兒案件，最高法院實務認係婦女決定施行人工流產之「權利」受有侵害，通說並進一步闡釋其為一新興型態之人格權。惟學者間對該權利之性質看法未趨一致，遂有「生育自主決定權」、「人工流產自主決定權」或「家庭生育計畫自主決定權」等不同名稱，而就該權利受侵害後之損害賠償範圍，學說見解更是南轅北轍。本文認為，所謂「自主決定權」其實係由身體權、健康權、自由權或其他法益統合而成之上位概念，基於規範目的與現行法制之整體性考量，無予以權利化為一新興人格權之必要。本文試由「責任成立」與「責任範圍」二層次損害概念之區分切入，直接審查此「自主決定權」概念所涵蓋之各項權利或利益於此類案件中是否受有侵害。 此類案件「責任成立上之損害」應可包括：懷孕與生產對婦女身體與健康權完整性之侵害以及因而發生之妊娠併發症、撫育該缺陷兒較諸健常兒額外之經濟上不利益、以及基於親情倫理所衍生之身心痛苦與家庭和樂障礙等，其屬性分別為權利、利益、典人格（或身分）法益，不同屬性因侵權責任或契約責任而有保護之差異。至於婦女符合優生保健法第9條規定得依其自願施行人工流產之法律地位，非民事上之法益；婦女雖因錯誤而決定繼續懷孕，但其意思決定之自由權其實未受侵害；中止胎兒生命係無奈之手段，因此，法定扶養義務因施行人工流產之必然免除，並非利益，反面言之，缺陷兒之基本扶養費即難謂為損害。 對應於前述身體與健康權侵害之「責任範圍土之損害」即為民法第193條第1項所定因此喪失或減少勞動能力或增加生活土之需要、以及第195條第1項所定之非財產土之損害；而人格（或身分）法益受有損害，其賠償範圍為第195條第1項（或第3項）所規定之慰撫金；至於經濟上之不利益，則為財產上之積極損害，包括照護缺陷兒額外之醫療費用、特殊教育與人力照顧費用等。

The Supreme Court validated for the first time the “right” of pregnant women to take legitimate artificial abortion for handicapped fetuses, which has been further defined as a unique “personal right” of self-determination on artificial abortion, self-determination on breeding, or self-determination on family planning respectively as elaborated diversely. The disputes on the recoverable damages arise accordingly. First of all, this article elucidate the concept of “damage” ,with which further steps into in-depth discussion concerning the recoverable damages in so-called “wrongful birth” cases caused by liable, inaccurate prenatal diagnosis and genetic consultation. Instead of regarding “the right to take artificial abortion” wholly as a unique “personal right”, this article would like to examine individually the ingredients composing the over-guiding concept of “self-determination of artificial abortion”. The body and health right for integrity and soundness, the personal familiar emotional interest, and the peculiar interest are the main categories of damages incurred in the “wrongful birth” cases and should be recovered both peculiarly and emotionally as such according to the Civil Code. Among them, the damages awarded herein concerning the peculiar interest should be limited to the difference in the financial burden posed by taking care of a normal and a handicapped newborn, i.e. the extra expenses of handicap-oriented daily care, education, treatment and training program...etc, however, rather than reflects the full costs of rearing a defective child. The claims for damages are not sound, nevertheless, regarding the violation of “freedom” and the deprivation of “chance” to take the legitimate artificial abortion, and the expense of daily life-maintenance for defective child.