This paper aims to explore the impact of Taiwan's constitutional revision on the cross-Strait relationship. The research method of this paper is document analysis. There were seven rounds of constitutional revision conducted in Taiwan between 1991 and 2005. This research has found that although the four rounds of constitutional revision conducted in the 1990s did not formally change Taiwan's official name and territory, it indeed changed the cross-Strait relationship through the distinction of the rights between the people of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, and the redesign of Taiwan's government system. The most important changes were that the people on the Chinese mainland were now regarded as "special foreigners" and the Mainland "special foreign country." These changes also paved the way for President Lee Teng-hui to release the "special state-to-state relationship" proposition in 1999. Consequently, Taiwan gradually abandoned its previous "one China" policy, which caused the PRC's drastic reaction. In addition, after the four rounds of constitutional revision, the president became the supreme policy-maker of the ROC (Taiwan) in the area of Mainland affairs. As the president is not responsible to any organ, Taiwan's China/Mainland policy is significantly affected by the president. On the other hand, after four rounds of constitutional revision, the Legislative Yuan has the power to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier, while the president has not the initiative to dissolve parliament to check uncooperative opposition parties. Given that a chasm in national identity has long existed in Taiwan, the above institutional defects led to serious inter-party struggles between 2000 and 2008 when the DPP was in power. Consequently, Taiwan could not make stable policies toward the Chinese mainland. The last two rounds of constitutional revision conducted after 2000 stipulated that the proposal of both constitutional revision and the alternation of national territory needed to be passed by the Legislative Yuan first, and then agreed by the people through a referendum. It is outwardly condusive to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. In fact, it deprived Taiwan of a useful weapon to deter China from attacking Taiwan, which also made the cross-Strait relationship more unstable, unless Taiwan submits to the PRC's will.