聯邦最高法院的所謂「抗多數困境」、乃至於司法違憲審查（相對於民主立法）的正當性問題，在美國憲法學界一直是最受關注的議題之一，然而爭議至今卻仍未有定論。有鑑於此，本文擬從美國法所植基之普通法傳統的觀察角度出發，嘗試透過對普通法背景底下法官處理個案（不同於歐陸法傳統）之特色的分析，來檢討當代美國憲法學界對於司法違憲審查正當性問題的辯論，並據此提出筆者個人對於這個問題在普通法背景下所呈現特色的看法。本文將試著指出，在普通法傳統同時講求判決先例拘束之穩定性、以及個案衡量之彈性的雙重訴求之下，法官毋寧在判決先例之遵循與逐案權衡之間，享有（根據普通法制度精神而來的）不受客觀拘束的裁量選擇權，並且透過這樣的裁量選擇權被賦予中心地位。若從比較法的觀點看來，對於「法適用」與「法制訂」兩種活動或要素之間的關係，在普通法與歐陸法（特別是德國法）傳統底下採取不同的看待方式，毋寧是造就普通法背景下法官活動的特色，乃至於法官的裁量選擇權與中心地位最主要的原因。由此角度看來，聯邦最高法院所處「傳統之嚴格權力分立架構」、以及「普通法傳統」兩項主要背景之間，毋寧存在一個根本的內在衝突關係，而這樣的背景也因此型塑了美國憲法中司法違憲審查與民主立法之間權限分際問題的特殊性。

This article attempts to examine the severe debate on the legitimacy of judicial review as well as the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty of the Supreme Court Of the United States from the perspective of the American Common Law, which, in contrast to the Civil Law Tradition, puts emphasis on the judicial role and in this way deeply influences the separation of powers between the Supreme Court and the Legislators in light of the American constitutional law. The author argues that against the American Common Law.., background, the Supreme Court plays a leading role which mainly results from the important function of judicial law making in the American legal tradition; this leading role, however, seems to stand in conflict with the American constitutional principle of the separation of powers that regards the judiciary as the weakest and the least dangerous branch. Through a theoretical analysis, the article indicates that the countermajoritarian difficulty is hardly solvable in the American Common Law Tradition.