在內閣制、總統制與雙首長制之下，行政立法呈現不同關係，進而影響多數政府是否出現。究竟何者較適於我國，除需瞭解何種關係較有利於政府順利運作外，也需考量我國現有國情與政治現實。 內閣制多數情況下係屬多數政府，也可能出現少數政府；總統制之下，可能出現多數政府，但也可能出現分裂政府。只有在法國，無論是呈現總統制或雙首長制，都是呈現多數政府的結構。 現行政府體制存在的最大問題在於：總統沒有主動解散立法院的權力。若總統堅持少數政府，而立法院多數賞（聯盟）又不倒閣，就會出現行政立法對立的困境。在現有制度下，過去六年半的經驗已注定：當總統所屬政黨未掌握立法院過半席次時，總統不會任命立法院多數黨（聯盟）支持者擔任行政院院長，而多數黨也不太可能會倒閣，行政立法之互動關係也因而陷入長期僵局。 由於總統制仍可能出現分裂政府，其缺點更甚於目前的少數政府，因之並不適合我國。只有透過修憲建立強制換軌機制，讓我國政府體制在總統制與雙首長制之間換軌，確保行政立法由同一政黨（聯盟）掌握，方能化解現有少數政府的憲政僵局。

The relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch is different among the parliamentary system, the presidential system, and the semi-presidential system, which will affect the appearance of majoritarian government. To conclude what system is most suitable for Taiwan, we not only need to see a system's efficiency in its operation on the government, but also need to consider Taiwan's specific situation and its political reality. Moreover, we find that no matter what it is, the parliamentary system or the presidential system, a majoritarian government or a minority (divided) government could exist. However, in France, despite it was presidential system or the semi-presidential system, the majoritarian government stands all the time. The major problem for Taiwan's existing political system is that the president cannot dissolve the Legislative Yuan by his own will. The relationship between the executive branch and Legislative branch would be in deadlock if the president insisted a minority government and the majority party in the Legislative Yuan had no intention to overthrow the cabinet. Under this system, the experiences in the past six years proved that the President would not appoint those who supported by the Legislative Yuan's majority party (coalition), and the majority party would also not overthrow the cabinet. Therefore, the interaction between the executive branch and the legislative branch is in deadlock all the time. According to our analyses, a divided government, which is worse than the existing minority government, might occur in the presidential system. If the constitution could be amended to construct the mechanism for forcible alternation between the presidential system and the semi-presidential system on one hand, and assure that the executive branch and the legislative branch would be controlled by the same party (coalition) on the other hand, the deadlock between the two sides could therefore be resolved.