日本的通產省，管轄貿易及產業政策，被視為是官僚中最精英、最有影響力、及 最自主的機構之一。通產省成功的原因在於：高素質的官僚及獨特的組織結構、自民黨的長 期執政、及通產省和企業界的充分合作等。而近年來，通產省的權力因下列原因正逐漸衰減 中：重疊的管轄範圍、官員事業上第二春(amakudari)現象的減少、自民黨政權的喪失、財政 體系的國際化、及行政指導的減少。 此外，在研究日本政治的學者中，對於“誰控制的官僚？”有兩種主要的說法：官僚至 上(bureaucratic supremacy)及國會優勢(Diet dominance)。官僚至上模型認為日本的決策中心 在官僚，而非國會議員。日本官僚制定政策、起草法案、加上自民黨放手讓通產省官僚一手 包辦產業政策，這些理由使得通產省享有高度的自主權。而國會優勢模型則認為國會可以完 全控制官僚。國會可以否決官僚的所作所為、可以懲罰官僚的錯誤、及可以控制升遷管道， 這些手段使國會可以控制官僚。然而，官僚看起來自主並不代表他們不受國會控制；兩國會 可以控制官僚也不代表官僚無法自主。誰可以控制日本官僚(通產省)？無論官僚至上或國會 優勢模型都無法提供一個滿意的答案。作者以為官僚的控制來自於許多不同機制間的互動： 自民黨、國會、企業界、及司法體系。因此我們不能排除任何一個機制都可能會對官僚權力 造成主要的限制。

　　　　　Japan's MITI (The Ministry of International Trade and Industry), whose jurisdiction falls trade and industrial policy, is considered among the most elite, influential, and autonomous bureaucratic agencies. MITI's capacity to implement a comparatively effective set of industrial policies can be ascribed to a combination of distinctive factors : high quality of bureaucrats and uniquely organizational structure, the LDP's long dominance in the Diet, and excellent cooperation between MITI and business. In recent years, MITI's power is on the wane due to : overlapping jurisdictions, decrease in the phenomenon of amakudari, LDP's failure in election, internalization of financial system, and less use of administrative guidance. In Japan, two approaches are concerned with the issue of "Who control the bureaucracy?" : bureaucratic supremacy and Diet dominance. Bureaucratic supremacy argues that bureaucrats are autonomous and free to the control of Diet because they draft most of statutes, and implement most of policies. Moreover, the LDP allows MITI extraordinary scope for autonomous action. Diet dominance contends that Dietmembers entirely control the bureaucracy because they retain a veto power over anything bureaucrats do, control bureaucratic careers through promotion, and punish bureaucracy for their undesirable actions. However, bureaucratic autonomy does not mean that the bureaucrats are free to the control of LDP. Likewise, Diet dominance does not indicate that bureaucrats are not autonomous. Who controls the MITI? Both bureaucratic supremacy and Diet dominance models cannot provide a satisfactory interpretation. In my view, control of the bureaucracy is a function of the interactions of the LDP, Diet, Business, and Courts. Therefore, we cannot single out any one mechanism as primarily responsible for these constraints.