While Taiwan transformed successfully from authoritarian rule to democracy, the problems of money politics have not been resolved but, instead, become even more complex and multifaceted. Special interests have captured national politics with open elections of representative bodies. "Agency cost" between people and their representatives, which would decrease in democracy, nevertheless increase with Taiwan's democratization and its society becoming diverse. As a consequence, in the post-hegemonic era, the regulatory underpinnings of money politics must be tackled with more diverse and dynamic directions. This paper argues that money politics regulations are divided into five types: rules of prevention, rules of competition, behavioral rules, sunshine rules and rules of accountability. The traditional focus of money politics regulations has been placed upon the rules of prevention and accountability. With the development of political liberalization and democratization, sunshine rules have gradually gained much attention. Both rules of competition and behavioral rules, however, are important strategies that we must put an acute emphasis on now, as we look forward political development. The author also suggests that effective regulations on official behaviors extend before the entry and after the exit of public officials. This serves not only the comprehensive cycle of behavioral rules for public officials but also, more importantly, provides a set of transparent rules for them to follow.