國營事業改革的方法之一，即採用公司化方式完成民營化的階段性目標。在法學上觀點，公司化後國家仍擔負各種不同的監督與管理義務，尤其在行政任務完全私化的過程之中，國家仍具各項主管法令之執行角色。因此「國家保留」之各項責任，不管是在公司化的任何過程之中，國家均具有憲法位階所賦予之「影響義務」。然而國家如何決定公營事業公司化的基本政策？而公司化之後的國家管制行為，如何在法律規範與擔保義務之間，建立適度的決策方法？依循自償率與代理理論與自償評估方法，可發現「台鐵公司化基本方案」窒礙難行的主要關鍵為政策不確定性與道德危險問題之應如何妥善解決；而經重新檢討補貼負擔基本對策後，對鐵路事業民營化之條件提升及相關權利義務之界定確有助益。

In the process of restructuring state owned enterprises, corporatization is one of the stages toward privatization. From a legal perspective, the state should continue to supervise and monitor the corporatized enterprises. In particular, the state should carry out a regulatory regime to protect stakeholders’ benefits during the privatization process, since it maintains a constitutionally mandated “influence duties”. How should such restructuring processes be managed strategically in ways that will further economic democracy, efficiency and social progress? What are the obstacles which hinder the establishment of a state commitment in corporatization? Drawing perspectives from agency theory and refining self-liquidating evaluation, the author underscores the uncertainties and moral hazards in the corporatization of Taiwan Railway Administration and suggests how the state can implement successful strategies to meet goals required by the privatization laws and build up a well-organized subsidy system to reinforce its influential role and regulatory capacity.