當今民主法治國家的憲法，莫不以權力分立與制衡作為設計中央政府體制的基本原則。根據孟德斯鳩權力分立學說，政府的權力應區分為行政、立法、司法三權，並分別歸屬於不同的政府部門行使。法國第五共和雖也將行政、立法、司法機關分屬不同部門獨立行使職權，但由於憲政設計上刻意強調行政權，造成「行政權大，立法權小」以及國會積弱不振。然此失衡的行政、立法關係，對於憲政制度的確立與發展確實有著不容忽視的影響。有鑑於此，自90年代中期，法國國會提出一連串修憲、修法的努力，均是為矯治過於偏袒行政權之憲政運作機制所帶來的現象。此外，法國國會採取兩院制，但是參議院的議員既非直接民選，審查法案亦無最後決定權，也沒有發動倒閣權力，故其角色無法與國民議會相比擬。因此，也希望經由修憲，以爭取兩院權力對等，充分發揮有效監督與相互制衡之功能。

In modern times, separation of power and checks and balances are two fundamental principals of the political systems that most democracies around the world uphold. According to Montesquieu’s theory, the government shall be divided into an executive, legislative, and judicial branch. Although the Fifth Republic of France also follows this model, its constitutional design grants primacy to the executive branch. As a result, since the mid-1990s, French senators have proposed a series of amendments to level the disequilibrium and fix the problems that exist in the bicameral system. The Senate, long inferior to the National Assembly, calls for more power in decision-making, personnel appointment and other rights.