In this paper, we examine the effect of the difference between tourists' lifestyle on determining the advance-payment rate in a recreation industry. We separate consumers into two groups, the weekday-type group and the weekend-type group. Two groups have different valuations about the leisure service provided by a firm. We also incorporate the tourist's consumer's price insensitivity into the analytic model. We find that the firm's rate of advance-payment depends on the market share of tourist's type, the price of leisure service, the leisure service price insensitivity, and the marginal cost of leisure service. Our welfare conclusion is that when the marginal cost of leisure service is sufficiently small (large), the advance-payment rate determined by the firm is higher (lower) than the socially optimal rate of advance-payment, this indicates that the firm's rate of advance-payment is not (over) economic efficient. In addition, we argue that the regulation that requires the rate of advance-payment cannot higher than 30% of the first day's guest room price would be not efficient. This is because the regulation ignores both the differences between tourist's tourism choice types and the firm's operating conditions.